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ABSTRACT

From Martin Frobisher in 1576 to John Franklin in 1845,
generations of European explorers searched for a navigable
route through the Arctic islands to Asia.
Their greatest
challenge was sea-ice, which has almost always filled the
straits, even in summer.
Climate change, however, is
fundamentally altering the sea-ice conditions: In September
2007, the Northwest Passage was ice-free for the first time in
recorded history. This Article reviews the consequences of this
development, particularly in terms of the security and
environmental risks that would result from international
shipping along North America's longest coast. It analyzes the
differing positions of Canadaand the United States with respect
to the legal status of the waterway and argues that the end of
the Cold War and the rise of global terrorism have changed the
situation in such a way that the Canadianposition-that the
Northwest Passageconstitutes Canadianinternal waters subject
to the full force of Canadian domestic law--actually coincides
with U.S. interests today, as well as the interests of other
responsible countries and shipping companies.

* Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, Department of
Political Science, University of British Columbia, michael.byers@ubc.ca. Funding for
this project was provided by ArcticNet, an arms-length consortium of scientists funded
by the Canadian government. See, www.ArcticNet.ulaval.ca.
** Professor, Faculty of Law, Universit6 de Montreal, suzanne.lalonde@umontreal.ca.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Where has all the ice gone?" Joe Immaroitok asked.1 It was
October 24, 2006, and he was staring at Foxe Basin. A shallow
expanse of ocean the size of Lake Superior, the basin usually freezes
over by early October, enabling the Inuit to travel across to Baffin
Island to hunt caribou. That winter, the town council in Igloolik was

1.
Interview with Joe Immaroitok, Member, Hamlet Council of Igloolik,
Nunavut, Can. (Oct. 24, 2006) (on file with authors).
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considering chartering an airplane to take the hunters across the
2
unfrozen sea.
A few hours before we spoke with Immaroitok, we had sailed
through Fury and Hecla Strait on board the CCGS Amundsen,
Canada's research icebreaker. All we saw were a few chunks of thick,
aquamarine "multiyear" ice-formed when ice survives one or more
summers and new ice accretes to it. The chunks, which had floated
down from higher latitudes, were easily avoided. The previous day,
we had passed through Bellot Strait-the first ship ever to do so in
October. We were 350 miles north of the Arctic Circle, but there was
no ice.
The two straits are part of the Northwest Passage, the so-called
"Arctic Grail. ' 3 From Martin Frobisher in 1576 to John Franklin in
1845, generations of European explorers searched for a navigable
route through the Arctic islands to Asia.4 Many of them-including
Franklin and his men-died in the attempt. 5
Their greatest
challenge was sea-ice, which has almost always filled the straits, even
in summer. William Parry spent the summers of 1822 and 1823
waiting for the ice to clear from Fury and Hecla Strait. 6 Although the
strait is named after his ships, he never made it through.7 Leopold
M'Clintock, dispatched by Lady Franklin to search for her husband
on King William Island, tried six times to penetrate Bellot Strait
during the summer of 1858 before continuing his journey by dogsled.8 It took Roald Amundsen three years-including two winters
lodged in the ice at Gjoa Harbour-to complete the first full transit of
the Northwest Passage in 1906. 9
In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment reported that the
average extent of sea-ice cover in summer had declined by 15%-20%
over the previous thirty years. 1° The remaining ice was 10%-15%
thinner overall and 40% thinner in some areas.ii These trends were

2.
3.

Id.
This expression was coined in PIERRE BERTON, THE ARCTIC GRAIL: THE

QUEST FOR THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE AND THE NORTH POLE, 1818-1909 (1988).

4.

On the history of the Northwest Passage, see generally id.; JAMES P.

DELGADO, ACROSS THE TOP OF THE WORLD (1999).

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

BERTON, supra note 3, at 263-69.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 45-52, 58-59.
Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 543-47.

10.

IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 25

(2004), availableat http://amap.no/acia/ [hereinafter ACIA]. The ACIA is a joint project
of the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee, the former an
intergovernmental network whose members include Canada, the U.S. and Russia. Id.
at 1.
11.
Id. at 25.
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expected to accelerate such that by the end of the12 twenty-first
century, there might be no sea-ice at all in the summer.
Satellite measurements analyzed by the U.S. National Snow and
Ice Data Center are even more alarming.' 3 In March 2006, the area
covered during the winter by sea-ice was at an all-time low: 300,000
square kilometers less than the previous year. 14 At this rate, the
Arctic could lose all of its multi-year ice by 2030.15 In September
2007, the European Space Agency released satellite imagery showing
that the ice-covered area in the Arctic had dropped to around 3
million square kilometers, roughly 1 million square kilometers less
than the previous minimums recorded in 2005 and 2006.16 The 2007
ice loss was approximately ten times greater that the average annual
reduction over the previous ten years. 17 As Leif Toudal Pedersen of
the Danish National Space Centre explained, "[t]he strong reduction
in just one year certainly raises flags that the ice (in summer) may
disappear much sooner than expected and that we urgently need to
understand better the processes involved."' 8
The satellite images showed that the Northwest Passage was
This remarkable-and remarkably suddenfully navigable.' 9
development is something that policy makers simply cannot ignore.
This Article reviews the consequences of the rapidly changing sea-ice
conditions in the Northwest Passage, especially in terms of the
security and environmental risks that would result from
international shipping there. It analyzes the differing positions of
Canada and the United States with respect to the legal status of the
waterway and considers how those positions might facilitate or
hinder efforts to deal with the new security and environmental

Id. at 13.
12.
13.
David Adam, Meltdown Fear as Arctic Ice Cover Falls to Record Winter
available at
at 12,
15, 2006,
(London), May
THE GUARDIAN
Low,
Jane George,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/may/l5/antarctica.environment;
Welcome to the Final Meltdown, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (Iqaluit, Nunavik, Can.), May 26,
2
2006, http:/nunatsiaqnews.com/archives/60526/news/climate/605 6_03.html.
Adam, supra note 13, at 12.
14.
Id.; see also Steve Connor, Scientists Warn Arctic Sea Ice is Melting at its
15.
Fastest Rate Since Records Began, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 15, 2007,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/scitech/article2864214.ece (discussing the
rate at which the arctic sea ice is melting).
Satellites Witness Lowest Arctic Ice Coverage in History, EUROPEAN SPACE
16.
AGENCY, Sept. 14, 2007, available at http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6Findex_0.html.
Id.
17.
18.
Id.
Id. The Passage opened again in the summer of 2008. Post of David Biello
19.
to 60 Second Science: Scientific American News Blog, Fabled Northwest Passage Open
for Business in the Arctic, http://www.scientificamerican.comblog/60-second27
20 0
(Aug. 27, 2008,
8-08science/post.cfm?id=fabled-northwest-passage-open-for-b15:24 EST).
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concerns. The Article argues that the end of the Cold War and the
rise of global terrorism have changed the situation in such a way that
the Canadian position-that the Northwest Passage constitutes
Canadian internal waters subject to the full force of Canadian
domestic law-actually coincides with U.S. interests today and the
interests of other responsible countries and shipping companies. As a
result, the two countries have a unique opportunity-not just to
resolve a longstanding dispute but also to cooperate in protecting the
security and environment of the continent and planet on which they
exist.
We recognize that the United States will not easily be persuaded
that Canadian control over the Northwest Passage serves its
interests. Consequently, Part XI of this Article sets out a number of
intermediate steps-identified through a model negotiation involving
teams of U.S. and Canadian non-governmental experts-that the two
countries could take to address their common concerns with respect
to Northern shipping. These steps, which make sense in-and-of
themselves, would build confidence in Canada's commitment to
developing the Northwest Passage as a safe and efficient waterway
for everyone's benefit.

II.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

Canada's High Arctic is a vast archipelago made up of about
19,000 islands and countless rocks and reefs.2 0 Baffin Island is larger
than Britain, 21 while Ellesmere and Victoria Islands are nearly as
large.2 2 Between the islands lie a number of possible shipping routes
connecting the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans (and later the Pacific
Ocean), with the widest and deepest route running from Lancaster
Sound through Barrow Strait into Viscount Melville Sound and

20.

DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160

(1988).
21.
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article9116318/Largest-Islands-of-the-World (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (entry for "Island").
Baffin Island, in the territory of Nunavut, is the world's fifth largest island at 195,928
square miles. Id. At 84,400 square miles, the island of Great Britain is the largest of
the British Isles and the eighth largest in the world. Id.
22.
Id. Ellesmere Island, in the territory of Nunavut, is the most northerly of
the Canadian Arctic islands and the world's tenth largest island with an area of 75,767
square miles. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/EBcheckedl
topic/185000/Ellesmere-Island (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (entry for "Ellesmere Island").
Straddling the boundary between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories of Canada,
Victoria Island is the ninth largest island in the world with an area of 83,897 square
miles. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
627741/Victoria-Island (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (entry for "Victoria Island").
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onwards through M'Clure Strait into the Beaufort Sea. 23
A
modification of this route diverts southwest from Viscount Melville
Sound through the relatively narrow but deep Prince of Wales

Strait.2 4

Historically, severe ice conditions in M'Clure Strait and

Viscount Melville Sound have forced explorers, adventurers, and
Coast Guard icebreakers to take a combination of more southerly
routes, all of which exit into the Beaufort Sea through Coronation
Gulf and Amundsen Gulf, to the south of Victoria and Banks
Islands. 25 But history is little guide for what is now happening in the
North.
It has long been assumed that these more southerly straits and
channels are too narrow, shallow, and subject to strong currents to
provide a viable route for larger commercial vessels. 2 6 However,
underwater mapping conducted from the CCGS Amundsen suggests
the contrary: With the ice gone, even chokepoints such as Bellot
Strait or Fury and Hecla Strait should pose no more of an
impediment to navigation that the Bosporus or Dardanelles. 27 From
our own anecdotal observations, an experienced navigator could

already take a large container ship or tanker through the straits in
late summer or early fall. It seems inevitable that the deeper, wider
routes further north will eventually open as well, as even M'Clure
Strait briefly did in September 2007 and again in September 2008.
Once free of ice, these routes could accommodate the largest of oceangoing vessels, including massive supertankers.
At the same time, there are many complicating factors, including
the Arctic Oscillation. This circular pattern of atmospheric winds
and ocean currents has already pushed the Arctic Ocean's shrinking
28
icepack away from the Russian coast, leaving it seasonally ice-free.
On the other side of the Arctic Ocean, the pack remains flush against
the northwest flank of the Canadian archipelago, with most of the ice
being "multi-year ice," which can be more than twenty feet thick and

23.
PHARAND, supra note 20, at 194-95, 201.
24.
Id. at 201.
25.
See id. at 189-201 (describing the main routes of the Northwest Passage).
26.
PHARAND, supra note 20, at 201
27.
See
generally Ocean
Mapping
Group,
OMG
in
ArcticNet,
http://www.omg.unb.ca/Projects/Arctic/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (describing
the Canadian Arctic Shelf Exchange Study which studies the effects of ice sea
variability in the Arctic).
28.
ACIA, supra note 10, at 83. The Russian government is promoting those
waters-the Northern Sea Route (NSR)-for shipping between Asia and Europe.
According to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, "for trans-Arctic voyages, the NSR
represents up to a 40% savings in distance from northern Europe to northeast Asia and
the northwest coast of North America compared to southerly routes via the Suez or
Panama Canals." ACIA, supra note 10, at 83. However, a number of factors-ranging
from still unpredictable ice conditions to run-down Siberian ports to high transit feeshave discouraged shipping companies from using the route so far.
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nearly as hard as concrete due to seasonal accretion of new ice and
29
the gradual leaching out of sea salt.
A. Climate Change, Science, and Sea-ice
For some time, scientists have differed in their assessments of
the likely effects of rising temperatures on ice conditions between
Canada's northern islands. Some have predicted that ice conditions
will become worse for shipping, at least for the next few decades. As
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment noted:
[R]esults of research at Canada's Institute of Ocean Sciences suggest
that the amount of multi-year sea ice moving into the Northwest
Passage is controlled by blockages or "ice bridges" in the northern
channels and straits of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. With a
warmer arctic climate leading to higher temperatures and a longer melt
season, these bridges are likely to be more easily weakened (and likely
to be maintained for a shorter period of time each winter) and the
flushing or movement of ice through the channels and straits could
become more frequent. More multi-year ice and potentially many more

29.
ACIA, supra note 10, at 24. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment provides
a very useful "ice primer":
Sea-ice is formed as seawater freezes. Because sea-ice is less dense than
seawater, it floats on top of the ocean. As sea-ice forms, it rejects the majority of
its salt to the ocean, making the ice even lighter. Because sea-ice is formed
from existing sea water, its melting does not raise the sea level. Fast ice (or
landfast ice) is sea-ice that grows from the coast into the sea, remaining
attached to the coast or grounded to a shallow sea floor. It is important as a
resting, hunting, and migration platform for species such as polar bears and
walrus. It largely disappears during the summer months (July to October).
Pack ice refers to a large area of floating sea-ice fragments that are packed
together. Ice caps and glaciers are land-based ice, with ice caps "capping' hills
and mountains and glaciers usually referring to the ice filling the valleys,
although the term glacier is often used to refer to ice caps as well. An ice sheet
is a collection of ice caps and glaciers, such as currently found on Greenland
and Antarctica. When ice caps, glaciers, and ice sheets melt, they cause the sea
level to rise by adding to the amount of water in the oceans. An iceberg is a
chunk of ice that calves off a glacier or ice sheet and floats at the ocean surface.
Id.
Other common "ice" terms include shelf ice which is an extension of glacial ice into
coastal waters that is in contact with the bottom near the shore but not toward the
edge of the shelf. Though permanent, it is not entirely stable and at particular times of
the year, the edge of the shelf can break off creating floating islands of ice. Multiyear
ice is the thicker sea-ice that has survived at least one summer melt season. In order
for the volume of Arctic sea-ice to stay roughly the same from year to year, the
multiyear ice that leaves the Arctic-whether pushed by winds or ocean currents or
succumbing to summer melt-must be replenished by first-year ice that grows in
winter and survives the summer.
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icebergs could thus move into the marine routes of the Northwest
30
Passage, presenting additional hazards to navigation.

The Canadian Ice Service, for its part, has predicted significant
yearly variability in sea-ice conditions, even if the Arctic region as a
whole experiences an overall reduction in sea-ice extent.3 1 This
would make regular navigation along the Northwest Passage difficult
32
and unattractive for the next few decades.
Other scientists believe that, as the Arctic Ocean icepack
retreats northward, less multi-year ice will make it into the
Northwest Passage.
Historically, multi-year ice from the Arctic
Ocean has been pushed into M'Clure Strait at the western end of the
Passage, stymieing even the SS Manhattan, a 1,005-foot long icestrengthened super-tanker that attempted in 1969 to break through
M'Clure Strait accompanied by two icebreakers. 33 Yet the southern
edge of the icepack is retreating inexorably northwards.3 4 As soon as
it retreats beyond the northern edge of M'Clure Strait, the Northwest
Passage could be covered primarily with thinner, softer "single-year
ice," which breaks up in late summer and poses little impediment to
ice-strengthened vessels.
There is the possibility that the multi-year ice might soon
disappear completely.
In December 2007, Professor Wieslaw
Maslowski of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School told the American
Geophysical Union that a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean was

30.
Id. at 84-85.
31.
Id. at 84.
32.
See, e.g., K.J. Wilson et al., Shipping in the CanadianArctic: Other Possible
Climate Change Scenarios, in 3 INTERNATIONAL GEOSCIENCE AND REMOTE SENSING
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 1856 (IEEE International ed., 2004), available at
http:llwww.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/KWIGARSSO4 NWP.pdf.
The GCM's [Global Climate Models] predicting an ice-free Arctic by the middle
of this century may lead many into a false sense of optimism regarding the ease
of future shipping in the Canadian Arctic. Sea ice conditions are highly variable
and there will still be summers of occasional heavy ice conditions. Studies
using the CIS [Canadian Ice Service] digital ice chart archive are indicating a
reduction in FYI [First Year Ice] in the QEI [Queen Elizabeth Islands] allowing
more 01 [Old Ice] to reach the NWP [Northwest Passage] and a southern shift
in the Beaufort Sea pack ice. Future navigation in the NWP may see a blockage
of the western NWP routes by the southern shift in pack ice and an increase in
drifting 01 creating choke points in narrow channels and significant navigation
hazards.

Id.
33.
See discussion, infra Part III.A.
34.
David Barber et al., The Incredible Shrinking Sea Ice, POLICY OPTIONS,
Dec. 2005-Jan. 2006, at 67, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/dec05/
barber.pdf.
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possible as early as 2013. 35 The prediction was obtained by adding
the factor of heat carried by ocean water into models based on data
from 1979-2004.36 The seasonal melting of all the sea-ice would spell
the end of multi-year ice, the principal shipping hazard, thus
enabling ice-strengthened cargo ships to operate in the Northwest
Passage throughout the year. This radical transformation of ice
conditions in the Arctic is also discussed in the 2009 Arctic Marine
Shipping Assessment (AMSA) Report drafted by the PAME working
group of the Arctic Council. The Report states that "[t]here is a
possibility of an ice-free Arctic Ocean for a short period in summer
perhaps as early as 2015. This would mean the disappearance of
'37
multi-year ice, as no sea ice will survive the summer melt season.
While short-term predictions vary, nearly all scientists agree
that by mid-century the Northwest Passage will be navigable by
regular ships for at least part of the year. Governments have been
warned to expect an open waterway well before then. In 2001, a
report prepared for the U.S. Navy predicted that, "within 5-10 years,
the Northwest Passage will be open to non-ice-strengthened vessels
for at least one month each summer. ' 38 For many, an ice-free
Northwest Passage is, therefore, only a question of time, and while
science aims to establish certainty, good public policy is frequently
based on analyses of risk. If there is even a 20% chance that the
Passage will be safely navigable for regular cargo vessels within the
next few decades, policymakers should be moving quickly to prepare
for that eventuality.
B. Why Ships Will Come
There is little doubt that the Northwest Passage will become
attractive to foreign shipping, for it offers a route between East Asia
and the Atlantic seaboard that is 4000 miles shorter than the current
route through the Panama Canal-saving time, fuel, and transit
fees. 39 It could also accommodate super-tankers and container ships
that are too large for the Canal. 40 In the near term, uncertainties

35.
Jonathan Amos, Arctic Summers Ice-Free 'By 2013,'B.B.C. (San Francisco),
Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sciencelnature/7139797.stm.
36.
Id.
37.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 4
(2009), available at http://pame.arcticportal.org/images/stories/PDFFiles/AMSA_2009_
Report_2nd_ print.pdf.
38.

OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AN ICE-FREE ARCTIC

2 (2001), http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/Arcticscenario.pdf.
39.

ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 44.

40.
See David Usborne, Path Between The Oceans: Tide Turns Against the
Panama Canal, THE INDEPENDENT (London), April 26, 2006, available at
http://www.independent.co.uklnews/world/americas/path-between-the-oceans-tide-
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about the weather, availability of search and rescue, and movement
of multiyear ice, along with higher insurance premiums, will likely
dissuade reputable international shipping companies from using the
Northwest Passage. However, less solvent and reputable companies
might take the risk, raising the prospect that some of the least safe
vessels on the oceans might actually be the first to use the
41
waterway.
Franklyn Griffiths argues that ships are more likely to go
42
straight across the Arctic Ocean to the north of Canadian. territory.
This is probably accurate for voyages between Asia and Europe or
between the west coast of North America and Europe, but going
around Greenland adds more than 1000 miles to voyages to or from
the east coast of North America.
Three or four foreign cruise ships already traverse the Passage
each summer. 43 In August 2008, a Danish cable laying ship, the MN
Peter Faber, needed to move from a project near Taiwan to another
project between Newfoundland and Greenland. 44 The captain chose
45
the Northwest Passage, sailing through without incident or fanfare.
The deepwater route of the Northwest Passage can also accommodate
super-tankers and container ships that are too large for the Panama
More and more ships are being built that exceed the
Canal.
"Panamax" dimensions of 294 meters by 32 meters with a maximum
draft of 12 meters (giving rise to a displacement of around 65,000
tons).46 The relatively calm waters within the Archipelago will also be
attractive. In 1999, a massive Russian dry dock was towed to the
Bahamas through the Northwest Passage in order to reduce its
47
exposure to ocean storms.

turns-against-the-panama-canal-475669.html (discussing how some ships are too big
for the Panama Canal).
41.
Rob Huebert, The Shipping News PartII: How Canada'sArctic Sovereignty
is on Thinning Ice, 58 INT'L J. 295, 302 (2003). Huebert warns of the "danger posed by
smaller and, possibly, more risk-oriented shipping companies" of which there is an
"alarmingly high number whose past actions have demonstrated that they are willing
to take dangerous chances with ship safety in the pursuit of profit." Id.
Franklyn Griffiths, Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: Time to Take Yes for an
42.
Answer on the Northwest Passage, in NORTHERN EXPOSURE: PEOPLES, POWERS AND
PROSPECTS FOR CANADA'S NORTH 1, 14-15 (Frances Abele et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://www.irpp.orgfbooks/archive/AOTS4/griffiths.pdf.
43.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 78-80.
44.
Capers and Capabilities-While Canadian Leaders Talk About Arctic
Sovereignty, Vessels from other Nations Cut Through Arctic Waters, CAN.-AM.
STRATEGIC REV., Aug. 29, 2008, http://www.casr.ca/as-arctic-sovereignty-capabilities1.htm.
Id.
45.
46.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 72.
Huebert, supra note 41, at 304-05; Alanna Mitchell, The Northwest
47.
Passage Thawed, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 5, 2000, at All.
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More shipping is also being generated by the increased
commercial activity in Canada's Arctic. In 2007, mining companies
spent $330 million in Nunavut in pursuit of gold, diamonds, uranium,
and other minerals. 48 On northern Baffin Island, the Mary River
iron-ore mine is under development and already has hundreds of
employees. 49 With 365 million tons of proven and probable reserves,
it is projected to produce 18 million tons per year for the next quarter
of a century. 50 The high quality ore will be shipped directly to Europe
on a fleet of 300 meter-long ice-strengthened ships purpose-built in
Finland and capable of operating in Foxe Basin, Nunavut, throughout
51
the year.
In the mineral-rich Kitikmeot region of western Nunavut, six
mining companies-including giants Rio Tinto and De Beers-have
joined together in support of the Bathurst Inlet Port and Road
Project. 52 The proposed port would be able to accommodate ships as
large as 25,000 tons. 53 Linked to a 211 kilometer all-weather road, it
would enable the companies to bring heavy equipment into their
mines and ship the extracted ore out to the market. 54 It would also
increase traffic in the Northwest Passage since Bathurst Inlet is on
Coronation Gulf, which is part of the southern route of the
55
waterway.
In September 2008, the MV Camilla Desgagnis, an icestrengthened cargo ship, made a scheduled resupply run from

Number of Nunavut Prospecting Permits Drops This Year, CAN.
48.
BROADCASTING CENTRE., Feb. 3, 2009, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/
story/2009/02/03/nunavut-permits.html.
Andy Hoffman, Baffinland Confirms Vast Iron Ore Play, GLOBE & MAIL
49.
(Toronto), Feb. 20, 2008 at B.5; Interview with Arthur Yan (Legal Coordinator) and
Other Officials at Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., in Iqaluit, Can. (Feb. 20, 2008).
50.
Hoffman, supra note 49, at B.5.
51.
BAFFINLAND IRON MINES CORP., DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL FOR THE MARY
RIVER PROJECT 57-58, 60 (2008) (discussing shipping and operations); Arctic-Class
Capesize Ships, THE FEDNAV CURRENT (Montreal, Can.), Dec. 2007, at 1,

(describing details of the
http://www.fednav.com/anglais/the_fednavcurrent.html
ships).
(BIPR) Project,
See Bathurst Inlet Port and Road Venture
52.
http://www.nunalogistics.com/projects/clients/bathurst/index.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2009) (showing a client list for the project).
Bob Weber, Arctic Port Gathers Steam, TORONTO STAR, July 4, 2007,
53.
available at http:l/www.thestar.com/Business/article/232201.
Bathurst Inlet Port and Road Venture (BIPR) Project, supranote 52.
54.
55.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 20-21 (describing Coronation Gulf as a
favorable transit route). For a map showing the location of Bathurst Inlet within
Coronation Gulf and a discussions of the environmental effects of the Bathurst Inlet
Port and Road Project, see Hadi Dowlatabadi et al., Bridging the Gap Between ProjectLevel Assessments and Regional Development Dynamics: A Methodology for Estimating
Cumulative Effects, in RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MONOGRAPH SERIES 2003 § 3.1,
fig.6, http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/015/001/032/print-versione.htm.
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Montreal to four communities in western Nunavut. 56 The crew
reported seeing no ice in the Northwest Passage. 57 Desgagn6s
Transarctik Inc. the company that owns the ship, and Nunavut
Eastern Arctic Shipping, its main competitor, have similar voyages
planned for 2009.58
Increased shipping can also be expected to result from easier
access to Arctic hydrocarbons. All of the Arctic Ocean countriesCanada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States-have
mapped or are mapping the seabed off their coastlines in support of
claims to extended continental shelves under Article 76 of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 59 The U.S. Coastguard research
icebreaker USCGC Healy spent the summers of 2007 and 2008
mapping the Chukchi Cap, north of Alaska, in anticipation of the U.S.
Senate giving its "advice and consent" to ratification of the United
60
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The mapping has taken on heightened urgency as the result of a
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) International Polar Year project,
conducted with the participation of British Petroleum and Statoil, a
Norwegian company, to assess the oil and gas resource potential of
the Arctic. 6 1
In its CircumArctic Resource Appraisal (CARA),
published in May of 2009, USGS researchers concluded that the
Arctic contained about 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of
the world's undiscovered gas, mostly offshore, under less than 500

56.
1st Commercial Ship Sails Through the Northwest Passage, CAN.
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/northIstory/
2008/11/28/nwest-vessel.html.
57.
Id.
58.
Bob Weber, Thinning Ice Already Increasing Traffic in Northwest Passage,
THE
GLOBE
AND
MAIL
(Toronto),
June
14,
2009,
available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/science/thinning-ice-alreadyincreasing-traffic-in-northwest-passage/article 1181733/.
59.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, art. 76, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/
conventionoverviewconvention.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS] (provides the definition of
a continental shelf); see also Constance Johnson & Alex Oude Elferink, Submissions to
the Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf in Cases of Unresolved Land and
Maritime Disputes: The Significance of Article 76(10) of the Convention on the Law of
the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 161-79 (David Freestone,
R. Barnes & D.M. Ong eds., 2006) (summarizing recommendations of the Commission
on the limits of the continental shelf in regard to the submission made by the Russian
Federation on 20 December 2001 and the submission made by Norway on 27 November
2006).
60.
Robert Lee Hotz, U.S. Draws Map Of Rich Arctic Floor Ahead of Big Melt,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2007, at Bl.
61.
See International Polar Year, U.S. Geological Survey, Expressions of Intent
for IPY 2007-2008 Activities, I.D. No. 913, http://classic.ipy.org/development/
eoildetails.php?id=913 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (explaining that international
partners for the activities of the U.S. Geological Survey in the International Polar Year
included British Petroleum and Statoil).
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meters of water. 62 All the major oil companies will be looking at the
Northwest Passage as a potentially important shipping route in
support of their activities in the Arctic-just as Humble Oil (now
Exxon) did with the Manhattan in 1969.63 Royal Dutch Shell has
already commissioned an analysis of the legal status of the
64
waterway.
Finally, there are the "adventurers": men and women seeking to
relive the exploits of the early explorers by sailing small private
vessels through the Northwest Passage.6 5 In August 2007, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) arrested five Norwegians intent on
challenging Canada's authority over the waterway.6 6 The selfdesignated 'Vikings" sailed their yacht, the Berserk II, three-quarters
67
of the way through the waterway without seeking permission.
Fortunately, authorities had deported two members of the crew from
Canada on a previous occasion for reasons unrelated to Arctic
sovereignty (membership in the Norwegian branch of the Hells
Angels motorcycle gang). 68 These two individuals made the mistake
of disembarking from the yacht and setting foot on indisputably
sovereign Canadian soil just outside Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. 6 9 At
this point, the RCMP pounced, assisted by a Canadian Coast Guard
70
light icebreaker, the CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier.
But what if the
Norwegians had not set foot on Canadian soil? What if, instead of a
small yacht, the vessel was a single-hulled oil tanker flying a flag of

62.
Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the
Arctic, 324 SCIENCE 1175, 1175 (2009).
63.

DONAT PHARAND, NORTHWEST PASSAGE: ARCTIC STRAITS 47 (1984).

[O]il companies began to consider the possibility of using the Northwest
Passage to transport oil to the American eastern seabord. Consequently, in
1969 Humble Oil (now Exxon USA) had the S/T Manhattan,a huge 155,000-ton
tanker, converted into an icebreaking vessel and sent through the Northwest
Passage to determine the feasibility of year-round navigation.
Id.
64.
This information was obtained through confidential interviews conducted
by the authors.
65.
See Sara Minogue, Rites of Passage Thwart Northern Adventurers, THE
GLOBE
AND
MAIL
(Toronto),
Sept. 8,
2007,
at A14,
available at
http://www.saraminogue.comlstories/rites.html (providing accounts of sailors that are
failing to register).
66.
For a partial report of the incident, see Bill Curry, Viking Invaders Turned
Back from Our Shores, The GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 1, 2007, at A3.
Coincidentally, one of the authors of this article (Byers) was in Cambridge Bay the day
after the arrests and able to interview local officials "off-the-record."
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
See Byers & Layton, How to Strengthen Our Arctic Security, THE TYEE,
Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://thetyee.caNiews/2OO7/O9/O6/ColdReality/ (discussing
how the CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier helped RCMP with the arrest of five Norweigans).
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convenience or a container ship with possible links to North Korea,
Iran, or Al-Qaeda? The next Parts of this Article examine the
difficult question of national jurisdiction within the Northwest
Passage to deal with environmental or security threats.

III.

THE LEGAL DISPUTE:

1880-1985

Ownership is not an issue with regard to the islands of the Arctic
archipelago, 71 which Britain assigned to Canada in 1880.72 The
resulting title has not been contested since Denmark abandoned its
claim to Ellesmere Island in 1920 and Norway abandoned its claim to
the Sverdrup Islands in 1928-1930. 73 The only exception has been an
inconsequential dispute with Denmark over Hans Island, a tiny,
barren islet between Ellesmere Island and northern Greenland in the
middle of Kennedy Channel, more than 500 miles to the north of
Lancaster Sound (the principal eastern entrance to the Northwest
74
Passage).
A. The Sector Theory
As for the Northwest Passage itself, the nearly impenetrable ice
meant that the issue of ownership and control of the waterway was,
for decades, never even discussed. 75 At most, a claim to the Arctic
waters was implicit in an assertion made in 1907 by Canadian
Senator Pascal Poirier that Canada owned everything within a pieshaped sector extending from the continental coastline to the
geographic North Pole.7 6 The same perception of Canada's Arctic

71.
N.C. Howson, Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute over the
Arctic's Northwest Passage,26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 346 (1988). According to
Howson, "[n]o nation, including the United States, challenges Canada's territorial
sovereignty over the ice-covered islands of the Arctic archipelago." Id.
72.
For a historical account of Canada's Arctic sovereignty, see Ivan L. Head,
Canadian Claims to TerritorialSovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 MCGILL L.J. 200
(1963). By an Order-in-Council dated 31 July 1880, "...all the British possessions on
the American continent, not hitherto annexed to any colony..." were transferred to
Canada. Id. at 212.
73.
R.R. Roth, Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Arctic Waters 28 ALTA L.REV.
845, 851 (1990).
74.
Kenn Harper, Hans Island Resources, http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/
hansIslandldefault.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
75.
Head, supra note 72 at 218. In 1963, Ivan Head, then at the Canadian
Department of External Affairs, wrote: "It is highly unlikely that uninterrupted surface
passage from the Labrador Sea to either the Arctic Ocean or the Beaufort Sea, or vice
versa, will ever be a reality." Id.
76.
Robert S. Reid, The Canadian Claim to Sovereignty Over the Waters of the
Arctic, [1974] 12 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 115. Reid reports that the first official
manifestation of the sector theory was a 1904 Canadian Department of the Interior
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7v
sovereignty was shared by Canadian explorer Captain J.E. Bernier,
who, on July 1, 1909, affixed a plaque on Melville Island that reads:

This Memorial is erected today to commemorate the taking possession
for the DOMINION OF CANADA of the whole ARCTIC
ARCHIPELAGO lying to the north of America from longitude 60°W. to
78
141°W. up to latitude 90°N.

In 1946, Lester B. Pearson, then Canada's ambassador to the United
States, made the claim over water explicit by declaring that the
sector theory justified Canada's claims "not only to the land within
the sector, but to the frozen sea as well. ' 79 However, subsequent
government pronouncements cast doubt on Canada's reliance on the
80
sector theory as a basis for its claims.
Nor has the applicability of the sector theory to Arctic waters
ever been accepted internationally.
When Norway recognized
Canada's sovereignty over the Sverdrup Islands in 1930, it specified
that the move was "in no way based on any sanction whatever of
what is named 'the sector principle.' '81 When the Soviet Union used
the sector theory to define its Arctic territory in 1926, it chose not to
apply the theory to the ice or waters beyond the then three-mile limit
of the territorial sea. 82 The same is true in the Antarctic, where a
number of countries have claimed sectors of the continent but not the
83
outlying waters or seabed.
Faced with international opposition to its sector-based claim, the
Canadian government for decades chose to neither advance nor

map showing "the western boundary of Canada as being the 141st meridian of west
longitude extending to the Pole, and the eastern boundary as being the 60th meridian
of west longitude extending from just east of Ellesmere Island northerly to the Pole."
Id.
77.
Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A
Reassessment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 336 (1993).
78.
I HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 1730 (Jul. 10, 1909) (Can.) (inscription by
J.E. Bernier), reprinted in Head, supra note 72, at 211.
79.
Lester B. Pearson, Canada Looks Down North, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 638, 639
(1946); see also Reid, supra note 76, at 115.
80.
For example, see III HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 6958 (August 3, 1956)
(Can.) (statement of Hon. Jean Lesage). Lesage was the minister of the newly created
Department of Northern Affairs.
81.
Note from Daniel Steen, The Norwegian Charg6 d'Affaires, London, to
Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London (Aug. 8, 1930),
available at http:/Ibyers.typepad.com/arctic/1930.html.
82.
Reid, supra note 76, at 116. Donat Pharand writes: "[T]he general opinion
of publicists and informed commentators is that the sector theory has no legal validity
as a source of title in international law, and cannot serve as a legal basis for the
acquisition of sovereignty over land, and, a fortiori, over sea areas." Donat Pharand,
Canada'sArctic Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, 7 DALHOUSIE L.J. 315, 324 (1983).
83.
Stuart B. Kaye, Territorial Sea Baselines Along Ice Covered Coasts:
InternationalPractice and Limits of the Law of the Sea, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 75,
79 (2004).
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explicitly abandon the argument. In August 2006, however, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper surrendered the sector theory in a speech in
Iqaluit, Nunavut:
I am here today to make it absolutely clear there is no question about
Canada's Arctic border. It extends from the northern tip of Labrador
all the way up the East coast of Ellesmere Island to Alert. Then it
traces the western perimeter of the Queen Elizabeth Islands down to
the Beaufort Sea. From there it hugs the coasts of the Northwest
Territories and Yukon to the Canada-U.S. border at Alaska. All along
the border, our jurisdiction extends outward 200 miles into the
surrounding sea, just as it does along our Atlantic and Pacific
84
coastlines. No more. And no less.

As defined by Harper, the limits of Canada's jurisdiction along the
northwest flank of the Arctic Archipelago fall hundreds of miles short
of the 141st meridian.
B. The SS Manhattan
In 1969, an American company, Humble Oil, sent an icestrengthened super-tanker-the
SS Manhattan-through the
Northwest Passage.8 5 The voyage was designed to test whether the
route could be used to transport Alaskan oil to the Atlantic
seaboard.8 6
The U.S. government dispatched the Coastguard
icebreaker Northwind to accompany the vessel and made a point of
not seeking permission from Canada.8 7 The Canadian government
responded by granting permission anyway.88 It sent one of its own

84.
Stephen Harper, Can. Prime Minister, Speech on Securing Canadian
Sovereignty in the Arctic (Aug. 12, 2006), available at http:/byers.typepad.com/arctic/
2009/03/securing-canadian-sovereignty-in-the-arctic.html.
85.
T.C. Pullen & H. Ian MacDonald, S.S.Manhattan's Northwest Passage
Voyage-Observations by Canada's Representative (Feb. 12, 1970), transcribed in THE
EMPIRE
CLUB
OF
CANADA
ADDRESSES
260
(1970),
available
at
http://speeches.empireclub.org/details.asp?r=vs&ID= 61281&number=l.
86.
Id. The ship sailed on August 24, 1969, and completed navigation of the
Passage on September 14, 1969. Reid, supra note 76, at 111 n.1. The Manhattan was
specially modified into an ice-breaking vessel of 115,000 tons and 43,000 horsepower.
Id. Built in 1962, it was at the time the largest merchant ship ever to fly the American
flag and the largest commercial ship ever constructed in the United States. Id. "The
Manhattan... was as long as the Empire State building laid on its side and displaced
about twice the amount of water as the Queen Elizabeth." Larry Gedney & Merritt
Helfferich, Voyage of the Manhattan, Dec. 19, 1983, Alaska Science Forum Article No.
639, http://www.gi.alaska.edu/ScienceForum/ASF6/689.html. For an account of the
Manhattan's voyage, see Bern Keating, North for Oil: Manhattan Makes the Historic
Northwest Passage, 137 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 374 (1970).
87.
J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 339 (1996).
88.
See Pullen & MacDonald, supra note 85 (Canadian government
representative remarks imply that permission was given).

2009]

WHO CONTROLS THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE?

1149

icebreakers to help8 9 and arranged for a Canadian government
representative, Captain Thomas Charles Pullen, to be on board the
Manhattanduring the transit. 90
Although Washington's refusal to ask for prior authorization
unleashed a political storm in Ottawa, the firm belief that the
Manhattan would not sail through areas under Canadian jurisdiction
was the basis for the refusal. 9 1 At the time, Canada claimed only a 3mile territorial sea, which left a high seas corridor through the
Northwest Passage. 92 American officials had therefore intended that
the Manhattan would remain on the high seas throughout its voyage,
entering the Passage through Lancaster Sound and exiting through
M'Clure Strait at the western end. 93 Indeed, prior to the Manhattan's
voyage, the State Department had informed the Canadian
government that it had no intention of staking a claim to the
94
Northwest Passage and was merely undertaking a feasibility study.
However, on the night of September 10, 1969, while attempting to
become the first vessel ever to make an east-to-west passage of
M'Clure Strait, the Manhattan became trapped in the ice. 95 "She
escaped only when steam was diverted from heating the living spaces
to squeeze an additional 7,000 horsepower from her 43,000
horsepower turbines. Even then, it was only with the assistance of
her constant companion, the Canadian icebreaker, 'John A.
McDonald,' that she was able to escape. '96 These circumstances
forced the Manhattan to turn back and use the narrow Prince of
Wales Strait, where, as Pharand explains, "it had to go through the
territorial waters of Canada because of the presence of the small

89.
Id. The accompanying Canadian Coast Guard vessel was the J.A.
Macdonald, a heavy icebreaker built in 1960 with a cruising range of 20,000 nautical
miles and a displacement of 9,000 tons. Id. According to the New York Times: "The
'Johnny Mac', as the vessel is called by the crew of the Manhattan, started out on the
expedition as just another member of the supporting cast, but she earned co-star status
by her performance on the voyage. The sturdy veteran of 10 seasons in the Arctic freed
the Manhattan from ice on at least 12 occasions." W.D. Smith, Tanker Manhattan is
Escorted Into Halifax Harbor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1969.
90.
Pullen & MacDonald, supra note 86. Captain Pullen played a critical role
throughout the voyage, "advising Humble Oil on matters of ice navigation, ice
seamanship, route selection and tactics appropriate to ships working as a group in
heavy pack ice." Id.
91.
See John Kirton & Don Munton, The Manhattan Voyages and Their
Aftermath, in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE 73, 73-97 (Franklyn Griffiths ed.,

1987) (chronicling Ottawa's response to the Manhattan voyage).
92.
Reid, supranote 76, at 120.
93.
Id.
94.
Jay Walz, Oil Stirs Concern Over Northwest Passage Jurisdiction, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1969, at 12.
95.
Gedney & Helfferich, supra note 86.
96.
Id.
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Princess Royal Islands. ' 97 The unanticipated character of the
entrance into Canadian territorial waters, combined with Canada's
unsolicited permission, the acceptance of considerable assistance from
the Canadian Coast Guard, and the welcoming of Captain Pullen on
Ottawa later argued-any undermining of
board prevented-as
98
Canada's claim.
C. Arctic Waters PollutionPreventionAct

The following year, the Canadian Parliament adopted the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA).99 The legislation imposed
strict safety and environmental requirements on all shipping within
100 nautical miles of Canada's Arctic coast, including the islands. 100
The AWPPA was, at the time, contrary to international law, which
did not recognize coastal state rights in the waters beyond the
territorial sea. 10 1 Indeed, the Canadian government effectively
admitted that the AWPPA was illegal when, shortly before adopting
the statute, it entered a reservation to its acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
that prevented any future litigation over the matter. 10 2 The United

97.
Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final
Revisit, 38 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 3, 38 (2007).
Kirton & Munton, supra note 91 (discussing the diplomatic response to
98.
these voyages).
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. ch. 2 (1970), amended by
99.
S.C. ch. 41 (1977-78) (Can.).
100.
R.S.C. ch.2. With the AWPPA, Canada was asserting a right to enforce
pollution prevention regulations on all ships passing through the 100 mile zone,
including construction, equipment and staffing standards for Arctic-going vessels. Id.
Failure to comply with these standards would result in the prohibition of passage. Id.
Under the Act, this broad assertion of jurisdiction was justified with reference to
Canada's responsibility for the exploitation of the Arctic's resources as well as for the
welfare of its inhabitants and the preservation of its unique ecological balance. Id.
101.
Coastal rights beyond the territorial sea were recognized, however, as
regards the continental shelf.
102.
Texts Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, 24 INT'L CT. JUST. Y.B. 45,
55-56 (1969-70). The reservation excluded from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
over Canada any
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised
by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the
coast of Canada.
Id. In explaining the need for the reservation, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
acknowledged that there was a "very grave risk that the World Court would find itself
obliged to find that coastal states cannot take steps to prevent pollution. Such a
legalistic decision would set back immeasurably the development of law in this critical
area." Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister Can., Press Speech (Apr. 8, 1970), quoted in
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States responded to the legislation by sending a diplomatic note
entitled "U.S. Opposes Unilateral Extension by Canada of High Seas
Jurisdiction."'10 3 The note explained the reason for the United States'
position as follows:
We are concerned that this action by Canada if not opposed by us,
would be taken as precedent in other parts of the world for other
unilateral infringements of the freedom of the seas. If Canada had the
right to claim and exercise exclusive pollution and resources
jurisdiction on the high seas, other countries could assert the right to
exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some reasonable and some not,
104
but equally invalid according to international law.

The United States suggested that Canada voluntarily submit the
0 6
issue to the ICJ, 10 5 but Canada refused to do so.1
The dispute over the AWPPA receded after the 1982 adoption of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 234 of
which allows coastal states to enact laws against maritime pollution
out to 200 nautical miles when almost year-round ice creates
exceptional navigational hazards. 0 7 The adoption of this provision
also contributed to the development of a parallel rule of customary
international law, as Canada effectively recognized when it rescinded
the reservation to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ in 1985-nine years before UNCLOS came into force and a full
eighteen years before Canada ratified the treaty. 0 8 In the following
two decades, no one challenged Canada before the ICJ about the
AWPPA or any of its other Arctic-related claims. On June 11, 2009,
Canada took full advantage of Article 234 by extending the reach of
the AWPPA to 200 nautical miles.' 0 9

Richard Bilder, The CanadianArctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on
the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1970-1971).
103.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 121 (Apr. 15, 1970),
quoted in J.A. Beesley & C.B. Bourne, CanadianPractice in InternationalLaw During
1970 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department
of External Affairs, [1971] 9 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 276, 287-88.
104.
Id. In 1978, a Canadian official acknowledged that a "drawer full of
protests" had been received concerning the AWPPA. Comments of Erik Wang, Dir. of
Legal Operations, Dep't of External Affairs, Can., House of Commons, Standing Comm.
on External Affairs and Nat'l Def., Proceedings, No. 16 (Apr. 27, 1978), quoted in Ted
McDorman, The New Definition of 'CanadaLands' and the Determination of the Outer
Limit of the Continental Shelf, 14 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 195, 215 (1983).
105.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, supranote 102, at 289.
106.
Beesley & Bourne, supra note 103, at 289-94.
107.
UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 234.
108.
See Texts Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note 103, at 64
(terminating Canada's acceptance "of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice").
109.
Randy Boswell, New Measures Beef Up Control of Arctic: Expert Canadian
Authority Over Shipping Extended, OTTAWA CITIZEN, June 19, 2009, available at
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A second piece of legislation, also adopted in 1970, extended
110
Canada's territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles.
Although the United States also officially protested against this
measure, 1 11 the extension of Canada's territorial sea to twelve miles
was far less controversial than the AWPPA since sixty other countries
112
Its immediate relevance lay in
had already made similar claims.

the fact that the Northwest Passage is less than twenty-four miles
across at its narrowest points.1 1 3 It thus became impossible to travel
through the Passage, as the captain of the Manhattan had planned,
without passing through Canada's territorial sea at certain
Canadian
to
the
"According
choke-points. 114
geographical
government, the newly overlapping territorial seas entitled it to
subject any transiting vessel to the full range of Canada's domestic
laws.""l

5

http://www.canada.com/Technology/measures+beef+control+Arctic+expert/1710976/
story.html.
Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 1969-1970 S.C.,
110.
ch. 68, sec. 1243 (Can.).
The April 15, 1970 diplomatic note entitled "U.S. Opposes Unilateral
111.
Extension by Canada of High Seas Jurisdiction" "attacked both extensions: the first,
from three to twelve miles for the territorial sea, and the second, over all shipping in
the Arctic waters for one hundred miles." Howson, supra note 71, at 352 n.72 (citation
omitted). Howson's interpretation seems to be borne out by the use of the plural in the
first sentence of the diplomatic note: "International law provides no basis for these
" Press Release, U.S.
proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas ..
Dep't of State, supra note 103, at 288 (emphasis added).
112.
Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister Can., Remarks to the Press Following the
Introduction of Legislation on Arctic Pollution, Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones in the
Canadian House of Commons (April 8, 1970), in 9 I.L.M. 600 (1970). The right to a
twelve-mile territorial sea was eventually codified in Article 3 of UNCLOS. UNCLOS,
supra, note 59, art. 3.
113.
Kirton & Munton, supra note 91, at 73.
Howson writes:
114.
The 1970 Bill extending Canada's territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles ... was
designed in part to create an overlap of territorial waters in the Western
portion of Barrow Strait, where the widest gap of sea between islands dotted
across the strait (Lowther and Young Islands) is only 15.5 miles. This 'gate' of
territorial waters already existed under the 3 mile rule in the Prince of Wales
Strait, where the Princess Royal Islands, similarly dotted across the much
narrower strait, reduce the widest gap to less than 6 miles.
Howson, supra note 71, at 355-56 n.86. Since Bellot Strait is less than one mile across,
the addition of a gate in the Barrow Strait had the effect of forcing any vessel making
the passage, including through M'Clure Strait, to enter Canada's territorial sea.
Id. at 10. In 1970, the legal advisor for the Canadian Department of
115.
External Affairs declared in testimony before the House of Commons Standing
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence:
[The enactment of a 12-mile limit] has implications for Barrow Strait, for
example, where the 12-mile territorial sea has the effect of giving Canada
sovereignty from shore to shore. To put it simply, we have undisputed control-
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D. HistoricInternational Waters
At the same time, Canada began arguing that the straits and
channels between the islands were historic internal waters. Under
international law, a country may validly claim title over waters on
historic grounds if it can show that it has, for a considerable length of
time, effectively exercised its exclusive authority over the maritime
area in question. 116 In addition, it must show that, during the same

undisputed in the legal sense-over two of the gateways to the Northwest
Passage.
Standing Comm. on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedingsand
Evidence, No. 25, at 18 (statement of the legal adviser of the Department of External
Affairs), quoted in PHARAND, supra note 20, at 124.
116.
The first official statement indicating that Canada might be claiming the
waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters, according to
Pharand, was made by Prime Minister Trudeau at the time of the Manhattan crossing
in October 1969. PHARAND, supra note 20, at 111. The statement, included in a Speech
from the Throne, read in part:
Canadian activities in the northern reaches of this continent have been farflung but pronounced for many years, to the exclusion of the activities of any
other government. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police patrols and
administers justice in these regions on land and ice, in the air and in the
waters.
I HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 39 (Oct. 24, 1969) (Can.), quoted in PHARAND, supra
note 20, at 111(emphasis added in PHARAND). Pharand states:
Having specified that the Canadian Eskimos pursue 'their activities over the
icy waters without heed as to whether that ice is supported by land or by water',
the statement emphasizes the long duration of those activities and concludes by
saying that 'Arctic North America has, for 450 years, progressively become the
Canadian Arctic.'
PHARAND, supra note 20, at 111. Pharand also refers to a December 1969 report
prepared for the House of Commons by the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and
Northern Development in which it was stated: 'Your Committee considers that the
waters lying between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago have been, and are, subject
to Canadian sovereignty historically, geographically and geologically." Id. In December
1973, an official of the Canadian Department of External Affairs replied to a letter
enquiring as to the legal status of the Arctic waters, declaring that "Canada ... claims
that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on a
historical basis, although they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by any
legislation." Edward G. Lee, CanadianPractice in InternationalLaw During 1973 as
Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of
External Affairs, 12 CAN Y.B. INT'L L. 272, 279 (1974) (emphasis added). Pharand
comments that "[tlhis unquestionably constitutes the clearest and most precise
statement as to the nature of and basis for Canada's claim over Arctic waters."
PHARAIND, supra note 20, at 112. For an example of a country claiming title over waters
on historical grounds, see, e.g., Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 130-31
(Dec. 18) (holding Norway may claim waters as historic based on their exclusive
authority of control and acquiescence of foreign states over the control). See generally
CLIVE R. SYMMONS, HISTORIC WATERS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL (2008) (examining the role of historic waters in international law); Donat
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period of time, other countries, especially those7 directly affected by
the exercise of authority, have acquiesced in it."
Hudson Bay is a good example. Canada has claimed its 450,000
square mile expanse of water as a "historic bay" since 1906.118 The
United States initially filed a protest, but for more than a century, no
11 9
It would not be in the U.S.
country has publicly opposed the claim.

national interest to lodge public opposition, since shipping traffic
through Hudson Bay does not lead anywhere except the port of
Churchill, Manitoba.

Moreover, James Bay-at

the southern end of

Hudson Bay-extends to within 1,000 miles of Chicago, Detroit, and
New York City, putting those cities within easy reach of shiplaunched cruise missiles. However, thanks to Hudson Bay's status as
historic internal waters, Canada, in concert with the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization

(NATO) and the North American Aerospace

Defense Command (NORAD),
120
warships of non-allies.

can legitimately

deny

access to

Canada's claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes historic
internal waters is based on the fact that British explorers mapped the

archipelago prior to the transfer of title in 1880,121 and Canadians
patrolled and policed it after that date. 122 Canadian involvement in

Pharand, Historic Waters in InternationalLaw with Special Reference to the Arctic, 21
U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1971) (same).
See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 116 at 130-31 (Norway was able to
117.
claim waters partially due to acquiescence of foreign states over control); see generally
Historic Waters, supra note 116 (explaining concept of historic waters); SYMMONS,
supra note 116 (same).
OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112: UNITED STATES
118.
RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 10 (1992), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf.
119.
An Act to Amend the Fisheries Act, 1906 S.C., ch. 13 (Can.); OFFICE OF
OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 10.
120.
JOHN O'BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (2001); see also R.R. CHURCHILL &
A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 36-38 (3d ed. 1999) (provides a description of historic
bays).
According to Pharand, "British explorers, beginning with Martin Frobisher
121.
in 1576 and ending with those in search of the Franklin expedition in 1859, covered
virtually all the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago." PHARAND, supra note 20,
at 113.
Pharand provides a useful summary of Canadian activity in his book
122.
CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at Chapter 8 ("Historic waters
applied to the Canadian Arctic Archipelago"). PHARAND, supra note 20, at 122. In 1906,
Canada adopted legislation requiring whalers to obtain licences for Hudson Bay and
the waters north of the 50th parallel. Id. "In 1922, the Eastern Arctic Patrol was
created and annual patrols were made until at least 1958." Id. These patrols, for the
most part carried out by the RCMP, occasionally extended to the waters of the western
Arctic. Id. In 1926, the Arctic Islands Preserve was created within the sector formed by
the 60th and 141st degrees of longitude with the aim of protecting Arctic wildlife and
Inuit culture. Id. After World War II, the Canadian Coast Guard was established and
charged with the principal tasks of providing icebreaking services and re-supplying
Arctic communities. Id. Since 1970, Canadian survey ships have been active in
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Northwest Passage transits can also be cited as evidence of Canada's
123
authority over the waterway.
However, even if Canada has effectively exercised its exclusive
authority over the maritime area claimed, it still has to satisfy the
acquiescence criterion. 124 Pharand considers this to be a fatal flaw in
Canada's historic waters argument, for none of the early activity was
coupled with an explicit claim to the straits and channels between the
islands, while the United States opposed later explicit expressions of
the claim. 125 However, very few people considered the legal status of
the waterway prior to the 1960s and, to the degree anyone did, they
were working for the Canadian government in conducting sovereignty
patrols on water and sea-ice, legislating on whaling, and protecting
marine mammals and fish on behalf of an indigenous maritime
126
people.
Indeed, the strongest element in Canada's historic waters claim
is the use and occupation of the sea-ice by the Inuit, who have
hunted, fished, travelled, and lived on the Northwest Passage for
millennia. 127 In Kugluktuk, we interviewed Alice Ayalik, a 72-year
old artisan who spent most of the first thirteen years of her life on the
frozen surface of Coronation Gulf, where her family lived in igloos,
fished through the ice, and hunted seals. All along the Northwest
Passage, there are hundreds of Inuit elders who, in their youth, called
the frozen waterway home.
Prior to the negotiations on the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement, Inuit from across the Arctic were interviewed about
traditional hunting and travelling patterns. The resulting map
confirmed that the waters south of Ellesmere Island and the
Sverdrup Islands-including Lancaster Sound and Barrow Straitwere virtual highways for the Inuit and their dog teams. 128 More
recently, the Inuit Heritage Trust has been interviewing elders about
Inuktitut place names along the Northwest Passage. 129 The literally

surveying and charting the waters of the Archipelago and, in 1977, Canada instituted
the NORDREG registration system for ships entering the Arctic. Id. at 122.
123.
See discussion of the Manhattan and Polar Sea voyages at supra Part II1.8
and infra Part IIE, respectively.
124.
Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays-Study
Prepared by the Secretariat, [1962] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 19 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/englishja-cn4-l43.pdf.
125.

PHARAND, supra note 20, at 121-25.

126.
Id. at 121
127.
See David Vanderzwaag & Donat Pharand, Inuit and the Ice: Implications
for Canadian Arctic Waters, [1983] 21 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 53, 79-83 (discussing Inuit
dominion over the ice and their ability to cede it to Canada).
128.
The map is reproduced in PHARAND, supra note 20, at 165.
129.
Inuit Heritage Trust: Place Names Program, http://www.ihti.ca/placenames/pn-index.html?agree=0 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
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thousands of names confirm the centrality of the frozen waterway to
the Inuit's language, culture, history, and identity.
It is possible that the Inuit acquired an historic title over the
Arctic waters before the arrival of the Europeans, which they
subsequently transferred to Canada. 130
To succeed with this
argument, Canada would have to persuade other countries-or a
court or tribunal-that (1) sea ice can be subject to occupancy and
appropriation like land13 1; (2) under international law, indigenous
people can acquire and transfer sovereign rights132 ; and (3)
indigenous rights holders ceded such rights, if they did exist, to
Canada. The latter point is the easiest to prove, since the Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement affirms the intent of the Inuit to transfer to
Canada any rights they might have had over the sea-ice under
international law. 133 That particular provision was included at the
insistence of the Inuit negotiators, and its existence makes Pharand's
earlier dismissal of the historic waters argument less convincing than
it was before.
Pharand's views did, however, lead the Canadian government to
advance a different legal argument after the status of the Northwest
Passage was again brought into play in 1985.
E. USCGC PolarSea
In May 1985, the United States informed the Canadian
government that the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker USCGC Polar Sea
would sail through the Northwest Passage on her way home to
Seattle from Thule, Greenland, that August; the U.S. government
also invited Canadian Coast Guard personnel to participate in the
exercise. 134 The telegram reiterated the official U.S. position that

130.
J. Woehrling, Les revendications du Canada sur les eaux de l'archipel de
l'Arctique et l'utilisation immdmoriale des glaces par les Inuit [Canadian Claims to the
Waters of the Arctic Archipelago and the Historical Use of the Glaciers by the Inuit],
[1987] 30 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 120, 139.
131.
See S.B. Boyd, The Legal Status of the Arctic Sea Ice: A Comparative Study
and a Proposal, [19841 22 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 98, 105 (describing how ice has some of the
characteristics of land).
132.
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 79 (Oct. 16)
(recognizing that territories inhabited by indigenous peoples having a measure of social
and political organization were not terra nullius and thus conferred a limited but no
less real international legal status on these human "collectivits").
133.
Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Can. Inuit, art 15.1.1(c), May 25, 1993,
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.calprlagrlpdflnunav-e.pdf ("Canada's sovereignty
over the waters of the arctic archipelago is supported by Inuit use and occupancy.").
134.
Rob Huebert, Steel, Ice and Decision-Making: The Voyage of the Polar Sea
and its Aftermath. The Making of Canadian Northern Foreign Policy 211-14, 230
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis).
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this transit "will be an excuse of navigational rights and freedoms not
requiring prior notification.
The United States appreciates that
Canada may not share this position. '135 An American diplomatic
note followed on May 21, 1985, stating that "the two countries should
agree to disagree on the legal issues and concentrate on practical
matters" and that this valuable opportunity for cooperation should
"not be lost because of possible disagreements over the relevant
1 36
juridical regime."'
Canada responded on June 11, 1985, with a diplomatic note
reiterating its legal position that the waters of the Northwest Passage
were Canadian internal waters but also informing Washington that it
was "committed to facilitating navigation" through the Passage and
"prepared to work toward this objective. '13 7 It was Canadian policy,
as it remains today, to permit transits provided the vessels met
rigorous equipment and ship design standards specified in the
AWPPA. 138 Another American note on June 24, 1985, made it clear
that, "although the United States is pleased to invite Canadian
participation in the transit, it has not sought the permission of the
Government of Canada, nor has it given Canada notification of the
fact of the transit.' 1 39 However, the note also stated, importantly,
that the "United States considers that this transit . . .in no way
prejudices the juridical position of either side regarding the
Northwest Passage, and it understands that the Government of
'140
Canada shares that view.
According to Rob Huebert, by the end of June 1985, the two
governments felt they had worked out an acceptable arrangement
regarding the political and legal implications of the Polar Sea's
upcoming transit of the Northwest Passage. 141 Yet on July 31, 1985,
the eve of the voyage, the Canadian government sent a final
communication to the United States in which it
noted with deep regret that the United States remains unwilling, as it
has been for many years, to accept that the waters of the Arctic
archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of
Canada and fall within Canadian sovereignty.

135.
U.S. Dep't of State, Telegram No. 151842
OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 73. '
136.
American Embassy Ottawa, D6marche from
(May 21, 1985), reprinted in ROACH & SMITH, supra, note
137.
Canadian Embassy, Note No. 331 (June 11,

(May 17, 1985), reprinted in
the United States to Canada
87, at 343.
1985), reprinted in ROACH &

SMITH, supra, note 87, at 344.

138.
See discussion infra note 142 and accompanying text.
139.
United States, Diplomatic Note No. 222 (June 24, 1985), reprinted in
OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 73-74.
140.
Id.
141.
Huebert, supra note 134, at 239.
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* . . In this regard, the Government of Canada indeed shares the view
of the United States, communicated in the State Department's Note No.
222 of June 24, 1985 that "the transit, and the preparations for it, in no
way prejudice their juridical position of either side regarding the
Northwest Passage."

This information and these assurances have satisfied the Government
of Canada that appropriate measures have been taken by and under
the authority of the Government of the United States to ensure that the
Polar Sea substantially complies with the required standards for
navigation in the waters of the Arctic archipelago and that in all other
respects reasonable precautions have been taken to reduce the danger
of pollution arising from this voyage. Accordingly, the Embassy is now
is a position to notify the United States that, in the exercise of
Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the Government of
Canada is pleased to consent of the requested transit .... 142

In early August 1985, the PolarSea completed its east-to-west transit
of the Northwest Passage through Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait,
Viscount Melville Sound, and Prince of Wales Strait. Two Canadian
Coast Guard captains were on board as "invited observers.' 4 3
Despite the diplomatic understanding between the two countries,
144
the voyage "caused a rush of public anxiety in Canada.'
Commentators of all stripes denounced the government's response as
weak and ineffective and suggested that it had squandered a valuable
opportunity to strengthen Canada's legal position. 145 The uproar
caught the U.S. government off-guard. An unidentified "senior
official" in Washington was reported as describing an attitude of

142.
Canada, Note from Canada to the United States (July 31, 1985), reprinted
in OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 74. An exemption order under the
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act was issued for the Polar Sea. U.S.C.G.C. Polar
Sea Exemption Order, P.C. Order 1985-2409, SOR185-722 (Aug. 1, 1985). It was
reported that "[1]awyers went through appropriate laws with fine-tooth combs and the
Canadians took meticulous care over detail, down to the state of every piece of
environmental equipment on the vessel." Northwest Passage Not for the Soviets, U.S.
Envoy Feels, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 2, 1985, at Al [hereinafter Northwest
Passage]. As for Canada's unsolicited grant of consent, Huebert reports that the U.S.
was "taken aback"-for it was deemed inconsistent with the agreed upon nonprejudicial legal position. Huebert, supra note 134, at 240-42.
143.
Jessie C. Carman, Economic and Strategic Implications of Ice-Free Arctic
Seas, in GLOBALIZATION AND MARITIME POWER n.50 (S.J. Tangredi ed., 2002), available
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization andMaritimePowerDec
at
02/10_ch09.htm.
144.
Chapter 10-A Northern Dimension for Canada's Foreign Policy, in
CANADA, PARLIAMENT, SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONALISM: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON CANADA'S
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1985), available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/vl4no4/
6.htm.
145.
See, e.g., Franklyn Griffiths, Time to Ante Up in the Arctic Game, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 22, 1985, at A7 (Canada should "seize opportunity to make good
on Arctic waters claim"); Bill Schiller, Our Borderline Move on Arctic Sovereignty,
TORONTO STAR, Sep. 12, 1985, at A13 (discussing Canada's response).
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"surprise and disappointment" at the State Department, for they had
"tried to work it out so that nobody's legal rights were undercut," and
the trip as a confrontational
it was "absolutely wrong" to characterize
1 46
challenge to Canadian sovereignty.
F. Arctic CooperationAgreement
In the wake of the Polar Sea controversy, the United States
evinced a willingness to engage in bilateral discussions over the
status of the Arctic waters. After more than two years of negotiations
and thanks in large part to personal interventions by Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan, 147 Canada and the
United States signed a four-clause "Arctic Cooperation Agreement" on
January 11, 1988. 48 In the Agreement, the United States pledged
"that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by
Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the
Government of Canada. 14 9
McDorman encourages careful scrutiny of the wording and intent
of the 1988 Agreement. 150 Canadian consent is seemingly linked to
marine scientific research conducted by American icebreakers, 15 1 and
Article 4 spells out that "[n]othing in this Agreement . . . nor any

Northwest Passage, supra note 142, at Al.
146.
147.
Christopher Kirkey, Smoothing Troubled Waters: The 1988 Canada-United
States Arctic CooperationAgreement, 50 INT'L J. 401, 405-16 (1995); Brian Mulroney, A
Call for a New Northern Vision, POLICY OPTIONS, June 2006, at 5-9, available at
http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/unO6/mulroney.pdf.
Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1988, T.I.A.S. No.
148.
11565, 1852 U.N.T.S. 59.
Id. at para. 3.
149.
T.L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW
150.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 249 (2009).
Paragraph 3 of the 1988 Agreement states:
151.
In recognition of the close and friendly relations between their two countries,
the uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas, the opportunity to increase their
knowledge of the marine environment of the Arctic through research conducted
during icebreaker voyages, and their shared interest in safe, effective
icebreaker navigation off their Arctic coasts: - The Government of the United
States and the Government of Canada undertake to facilitate navigation by
their icebreakers in their respective Arctic waters and to develop cooperative
The Government of Canada and the
procedures for this purpose; Government of the United States agree to take advantage of their icebreaker
navigation to develop and share research information, in accordance with
generally accepted principles of international law, in order to advance their
understanding of the marine environment of the area; -The Government of
the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters
claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the
Government of Canada.
Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra, note 148, at para. 3.
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practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the
Government of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the
Sea in this or other maritime areas ....

*"152

McDorman's concerns

have proven correct. 153 On October 27, 2006, U.S. Ambassador David
Wilkins wrote a letter to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs
in which he stated:
For the record, the United States sees no basis in international law to
support Canada's drawing of straight baselines around its Arctic
islands and its claim that all the waters among the Canadian Arctic
islands, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of
Canada.
The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international negotiation.
Therein, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, in
accordance with international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention. The enjoyment of transit passage is not subject to
prior notice to, or permission from, Canada as the State bordering the
strait. However, an activity that is not an exercise of the right of
transit passage, such as marine scientific research, remains subject to
the other applicable provisions of international law.
Canada, consistent with its right as a coastal State under
international law, requires that marine scientific research may be
conducted in its waters only with its consent. Accordingly, as set out in
the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation of January 11, 1988, the United
States agrees to seek Canada's consent when U.S. icebreakers intend to
conduct marine scientific research as they transit the Northwest
Passage.
The Agreement expressly provides that neither it nor any practice
thereunder affects the legal views of the two Parties. Thus, the
Agreement does not affect the U.S. view that our icebreakers, in the
absence of marine scientific research, would not be required to seek
1 54
Canadian consent before transiting the Northwest Passage.

The fact that this interpretation is now an explicit part of the
U.S. position does not, however, settle the matter as a question of
international law. A different interpretation is just as reasonable, as
demonstrated by the fact that Robert Smith and Ashley Roach used
the conjunction "and" in their official compilation of U.S. legal
positions on maritime claims: "This agreement sets forth the terms
for cooperation by the two governments in coordinating research in
the Arctic marine environment during icebreaker voyages and in
facilitating safe, effective icebreaker navigation off their Arctic
coasts."

155

152.
Id. at para.. 4.
153.
See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
154.
Letter from David Wilkins, Ambassador of the U.S., to Peter Boehm,
Assistant Deputy Minister, N. Am., Dep't of Foreign Affairs & Int'l Trade (Can.) (Oct.
27, 2006), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/98836.pdf.
155.
OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 74 (emphasis added).

2009]

WHO CONTROLS THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE?

1161

McDorman's point concerning the non-prejudicial character of
the Arctic Cooperation Agreement and any subsequent U.S.
and
important
more
is
transits
icebreaker
Coastguard
the
addressed
unquestionably correct. The agreement successfully
principal irritant to Canada-United States relations in the Northwest
Passage by taking the issue of U.S. Coastguard icebreakers out of the
legal dispute. With the multi-year ice precluding voyages by other
foreign vessels, the deal regarding icebreakers was essentially an
"agreement to disagree" with respect to the Northwest Passage
dispute as a whole. 156 It created a new status quo that might have
solved the entire problem indefinitely if not for the sudden,
unanticipated effects of climate change two decades later.

IV. THE LEGAL DISPUTE: 1986 TO THE PRESENT
Following the voyage of the Polar Sea in 1985, Canada acted to
consolidate its legal position by drawing "straight baselines"
7
connecting the outer headlands of its Arctic archipelago. 15 Straight
baselines became a legally accepted means for determining the extent
of coastal state control along fragmented coastlines as the result of a
1951 decision by the International Court of Justice in a dispute
between Britain and Norway over fishing rights. 158 In making the
announcement, Joe Clark, then-Minister for External Affairs, stated
that "[t]hese baselines define the outer limit of Canada's historic
159
internal waters."
The Canadian Government received letters of protest from two
countries in response to the proclamation of its Arctic baselines. A
February 26, 1986 letter from James W. Dyer, Acting Assistant

Id.
156.
157. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C., c.T 7 (1970) (Can.).
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 128 (Dec. 18). The ICJ held
158.
that the use of straight baselines was permitted in only two geographically defined
circumstances: "Where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern
Finmark, or where it is bordered by an Archipelago, such as the skjaergaard." Id. The
second geographical criterion was modified slightly in Article 7(1) of UNCLOS:
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 7 (emphasis added). As Canada was not a party to
UNCLOS in 1986, its baselines were drawn pursuant to the ICJ's ruling in the
Fisheries Case. See discussion, infra text accompanying notes 178-79.
Joe Clark, Sec'y of State for External Affairs, Statement on Sovereignty,
159.
Sep. 10, 1985, reprinted in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE 271 (Franklyn
Griffiths ed., 1987) (emphasis added).
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Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to

Senator Charles Mathias Jr., a Maryland Republican, summarized
the U.S. position:
On September 10, 1985, the Government of Canada claimed all the
waters among its Arctic islands as internal waters, and drew straight
baselines around its Arctic islands to establish its claim. The United
States position is that there is no basis in international law to support
the Canadian claim. The United States cannot accept the Canadian
claim because to do so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian
control of the Northwest Passage and would terminate U.S. navigation
160
rights through the Passage under international law.

As Pharand observes, the letter does not specify whether the U.S.
objection was to the historic basis for the claim to internal waters,
straight baselines themselves, or both. 161 Since the letter clearly
asserts that there is no basis to support the Canadian claim, however,
Pharand believes that the U.S. objection refers to the claim itself,
"regardless of its precise legal basis. 162
The second protest came from the Member States of the
European Community through the British High Commission in
Ottawa. The diplomatic note stated:
The validity of the baselines with regard to other states depends upon
the relevant principles of international law applicable in this case,
including the principle that the drawing of baselines must not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. The
Member States acknowledge that elements other than purely
geographical ones may be relevant for purposes of drawing baselines in
particular circumstances but are not satisfied that the present
baselines are justified in general. Moreover, the Member States cannot
recognize the validity of a historic title as justification for the baselines
163
drawn in accordance with the order.

The European objection is clearly directed at both the Arctic baseline
system in general and the historic title in particular. However, if the
Canadian straight baselines were drawn simply to identify the
precise extent of Canada's historic internal waters in the Arctic,
McDorman believes an argument could be made that such baselines
are not captured by the normal rules concerning their length and
proximity to the coast. 164 Alternatively, Canada could argue that the
waters enclosed by the baselines are "non-historic internal waters," to

160.
U.S. Dep't of State, File No. P86 0019-8641, reprinted in OFFICE OF OCEAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 29.
161.
Pharand, supra note 97, at 12.
162.
Id.
163.
British High Commission Note No. 90/86 of July, 1986, reprinted in OFFICE
OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 118, at 29-30.
164.
MCDORMAN, supranote 150, at 238.
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borrow McDorman's description. 165 In this case, Canada's baselines
will have to satisfy the relevant international legal criteria governing
the construction of such lines.
In 1986, when Canada drew its baselines, it was not a party to
either the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone or the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
Consequently, the validity of Canada's baselines must be judged
according to the customary rules applied by the International Court
of Justice in the 1951 Norwegian Fisheries Case.166 In that judgment,
the Court, when determining the validity of Norway's baseline
system, defined a threshold requirement by limiting the use of
baselines to two particular geographic situations:
Where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern
Finnmark, or where it is bordered by an archipelago such as the
"skjaergaard" along the western sector of the coast here in question, the
base-line becomes independent of the low-water mark and can only be
16 7
determined by means of a geometrical construction.

The Court's threshold geographic criteria were subsequently codified
in Article 4 of the 1958 Convention and Article 7(1) of UNCLOS, with
the later provision explaining that
[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the
method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be
employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the
168
territorial sea is measured.

The key phrase with respect to Canada's Arctic baseline system is "a
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity." The
Convention does not define these terms. How then is a "fringe of
islands" to be defined, and at what distance offshore must such a
fringe of islands be in order to be within the "immediate vicinity" of a
coastline?
Roach and Smith tackled this two-part question in their 1996
study "United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims."
According to the authors, both employees of the U.S. State
Department at the time,
[t]he United States has taken the position that such a fringe of islands
must meet all of the following requirements:
*

165.
166.
167.
168.

the most landward point of each island lies no more than 24
miles from the mainland coastline;

Id.
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
Id. at 128-29.
UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 7, para. 1.
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"

each island to which a straight baseline is to be drawn is not
more than 24 miles apart from the island from which the
straight baseline is drawn; and

*

the islands, as a whole, mask at least 50% of the mainland
169
coastline in any given locality.

However, state practice does not reveal a general endorsement of
the American three-part test. As Johnston rightly points out, "the
Convention does not provide precise guidelines as to when straight
baseline may or may not be used, and to that extent concedes much to
Indeed, the lack of a
the discretion of the coastal State.' 170
mathematical measure to limit the length of straight baselines under
article 7(1) contrasts sharply with the precise limit of twenty-four
nautical miles imposed as a closing line for bays under article 10(5) of
171
UNCLOS.
Johnston alludes to the fact that the treaty version of the
geographic criteria defined by the ICJ extended the threshold
requirements:
[T]he ILC [International Law Commission] decided, after much
controversy, that the straight baseline of delineation should be
available generally to any state whose coastline was "deeply indented
and cut into" or to any state with "a fringe of islands along the coast in
its immediate vicinity": that is, to many coastal states whose coastline
172
was not nearly so complex as Norway's.

He concludes, however, that "state practice since the 1950s has,
as widely predicted, 'altogether failed to reflect either [the ILC's]
limited view of the occasions when the method is available, or the
notion that the length of straight baselines is inherently restricted by
'173
the concept of the 'general direction of the coast.""
Johnston's conclusions accord with a detailed study that the UN
Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea completed the
following year. 174 Given the importance and value of this source, we
reproduce a significant portion of the analysis relevant to article 7(1)
here:

169.

ROACH & SMITH, supra note 87, at 63-64.

170.
DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF OCEAN BOUNDARYMAKING 113 (1988).

171.
UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 7(1), 10(5).
172.
JOHNSTON, supra note 170 (citing Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, art. 4, para. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205).
JOHNSTON, supra note 170, 114 (citing 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
173.
LAW 211 (2d ed. 1970)).
174.
OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE
SEA-BASELINES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1989).
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35. In determining whether the conditions apply which would permit
the use of straight baselines it is necessary to focus on the spirit as well
as the letter of the first paragraph of article 7 ...
39. The spirit of article 7, in respect of indented coasts and fringing
islands, will be preserved if straight baselines are drawn when the
normal baseline and closing lines of bays and rivers would produce a
complex pattern of territorial seas and when those complexities can be
eliminated by the use of a system of straight baselines ...
41. While the phrase 'deeply indented and cut into' travelled intact from
the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case Judgment to the 1982 United
Nations Convention via the 1958 Convention, the phrase 'a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity' appears to be a
widening of the phrase used in the Judgement: 'or where it (a coast) is
bordered by an archipelago such as the 'skjaergaard.'
42. There is no uniformly identifiable objective test which will identify
for everyone islands which constitute a fringe in the immediate vicinity
of the coast ...
44. There are generally two situations where a fringe of islands is likely
to exist. The first, which is related closely to the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case Judgment, deals with islands which appear to form a
unity with the mainland. Such islands appear to be dovetailed into the
coast and on small-scale maps appear to be a continuation of the
mainland ...
45. The second situation occurs when islands which are some distance
from the coast form a screen which masks a large proportion of the
coast from the sea ...However the coast may be screened by a swarm
of small islands which by their number justify consideration as a fringe
46. The descriptive phrase 'in its (the coast's) immediate vicinity' is a
concept which has a clear meaning but for which there is no absolute
test. While a fringe of islands three nautical miles from the coast may
be considered as being in its immediate vicinity, a fringe 100 nautical
miles distant would not. It is generally agreed that with a 12-mile
territorial sea, a distance of 24 miles would satisfy the conditions. The
distance that has been proposed in the literature as a general rule is 48
miles, which could be exceeded in certain circumstances, but this figure
175
is not necessarily widely agreed upon.

Pharand has argued that the Arctic Archipelago "presents two
characteristics of fundamental importance" in regards to the
geographic threshold: "the proximity of the Archipelago to the
'176
[Canadian] coast and the unity of the Archipelago itself.
As for the proximity to the coast, there can be no question that this
element is present, since not only are most of the islands, which form
the base of the Archipelago located very close to the coast, but the coast
itself, through its central peninsula, advances into the very core of the
Archipelago.... The unity of the Archipelago itself is derived from the
interpenetration of land formation and sea areas, and this close
relationship is reinforced by the presence of ice most of the year. The

175.
176.

Id.
Pharand, supranote 97, at 16.
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geographic unity is further assured by the string of closely spaced
islands across Parry Channel, linking the northern with the southern
177
section and forming a single unit.

Having satisfied the threshold geographic requirement, the actual
construction of the baselines is subjected to further rules. In the
Norweigan Fisheries Case, the ICJ formulated three criteria to help
guide its decision: (1) "[Wvhile... a State must be allowed the
latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to
practical needs and local requirements, the drawing of base-lines
must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction
of the coast"'178 (the general direction of the coast criterion); (2) "[t]he
real question raised in the choice of base-lines is in effect whether
certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal
waters" 179 (the close link between land and sea criterion); (3)
"[f]inally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of
which extends beyond purely geographical factors: that of certain
economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of
which are clearly evidenced by a long usage"' 8 0 (the economic
interests criterion).
As evidenced by the European Community's note of protest,
Canada's Arctic baseline system sometimes faces criticism for failing
to satisfy the first criterion (general direction).' 8 1 However, the court
cautioned in its judgment that this first criterion was "devoid of any
mathematical precision,"' 8 2 and it even specified that "the method of
base-lines ...within reasonable limits, may depart from the physical
line of the coast."18 3 Still, as Pharand writes:
[J]udging from the commonly used Lambert conic projection, it would
be difficult to maintain that the first criterion of the general direction of
the coast is complied with. Indeed, the northern coast of Canada runs
in a general east-west direction, whereas the Archipelago appears to
84
project itself in a general northerly direction.1

Victor Prescott contends that the general direction criterion is not
only concerned with the direction of the coast of the mainland and
islands that dovetail into it.' 8 5 He insists that large islands can be

Id.
177.
178.
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 133 (Dec. 18).
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Pharand, supranote 97, at 12.
Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 142.
182.
183.
Id. at 129.
184.
Pharand, supranote 97, at 18 (citation to figure omitted).
185.
Victor Prescott, Donat Pharand'sCanada's Arctic Waters in International
Law, 5 NAT'L GEo. RES. 271, 272 (1989) (book review).
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fringed by smaller islands and points out that Article 121 of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention provides "that baselines for islands are
18 6
determined in exactly the same way as for other land territory."
On this basis, Prescott concludes, "a case could be made that the
small islands totalling more than 18 000 provide a series of fringes to
the large islands that interlock. This would lead irresistibly to the
conclusion that to draw straight baselines within the archipelago
rather than around its perimeter would violate the concept of fringing
8 7
islands."l
The second and perhaps better way of evaluating the general
direction of the baselines in relation to Canada's northern coast is to
use a map with fewer distortions than a conic projection. Pharand
explains that:
Although this projection [conic projection] is a considerable
improvement over the old Mercator, areas in high latitudes still present
considerable distortions. Those areas appear larger as one approaches
the North Pole and seem to point northward in a shape resembling a
triangle.
Fortunately, the distortion problem was solved in large
measure on a world map published by the National Geographic Society
in 1988, projecting the polar regions in a far more realistic manner.
The map displays the Robinson projection .... Of course, it does not
pretend to completely solve the problem of representing the globe on a
flat surface .... In spite of the remaining distortion at high altitude

[sic], the Archipelago is better represented. It is fully integrated in the
mainland, and it is oriented east and west in the same general
direction. 188

The fulfillment of the general direction criterion is even more obvious
on maps which are centered on the North Pole, with Canada, Alaska,
Russia, Norway, and Greenland all fringing a suddenly very large
Arctic Ocean. l8 9 Indeed, Pharand insists that Canada's baseline
system meets the stricter test formulated by the United States "that
the general trend of the most distant islands not deviate more than
20' from coastline or its general direction."'190
As for the second criterion (the close link), "the sea to land ratio
[in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago] is 0.822 to 1, considerably better

186.
Id.; UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 121, para. 2.
187.
Prescott, supra note 185, at 272.
188.
Pharand, supra note 97, at 18-19 (reference to figure omitted). The
Robinson projection can be found under the "pseudocylindrical projections" section of
the "Map projection overview" website developed by Peter H. Dana of the Department
of Geography, University of Texas at Austin, http:/www.colorado.edulgeography/gcraft/
notes/mapproj/giflrobinson.gif (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
189.
See, e.g., The International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean,
http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgglbathymetry/arctic/arctic.html (last visited Oct 9, 2009)
(an example of the type of map being described).
190.
Pharand, supra note 97, at 19 (quoting 106 U.S. Dep't of State, Developing
Standard Guidelines for Evaluating Straight Baselines, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, Aug. 31,
1987, at 16).
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than the 3.5 to 1 ratio" in the case of the Norwegian skaergaard. 191
In the same context, Pharand identifies a second positive factor that
(at least historically) strengthened Canada's position: "the quasipermanency of the ice over the enclosed water," which "bolsters the
physical unity between land and sea."'1 92 In a speech before the
Canadian House of Commons in September 1985, Joe Clark, thenSecretary of State for External Affairs, stressed this second factor:
Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea
and ice. It extends without interruption to the sea-ward facing coasts of
the Arctic islands. These islands are joined, and not divided, by the
waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice.
From time immemorial Canada's Inuit people have used and occupied
the ice as they have used and occupied the land. 193

The last line of this passage also speaks to the economics interests
criterion. The economic interests of the Inuit reinforce Canada's
baselines, which are valid under the two compulsory geographic
criteria. Indeed, the historic use and occupancy of the sea [and] ice by
the Inuit help to justify Canada's baseline system as a whole as well
as individual baselines. 194 Article 7(5) of 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention codifies this third criterion: "Where the method of
straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be
taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests
peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of
which are clearly evidenced by long usage."'19 5 In the 1951 Norweigan
Fisheries Case, the ICJ held that this economic criterion included
"nutritional and cultural dependence.' 1 96 In particular, the Court
found that "the survival of traditional rights reserved to the
[F]ounded on
inhabitants of the Kingdom over fishing grounds ....
the vital needs of the population and attested by very ancient and
peaceful usage, may legitimately be taken into account in drawing a
97

line."1

Pharand, supra note 97, at 19.
191.
192.
Id.
Clark, supra note 159, at 270.
193.
A few of Canada's baselines have been subjected to particular criticism: the
194.
Lancaster Sound line (51 miles); the Amundsen Gulf line (92 miles); the M'Clure Strait
line (99 miles); and the Borden Island-Ellef Ringnes Island line (62miles)." It must be
noted that neither the Norwegian Fisheriescase, nor the 1958 and 1982 Law of the Sea
conventions, fix any maximum length for straight baselines enclosing coastal
archipelagos. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); UNCLOS,
supra note 59.
UNCLOS, supranote 59, art. 7, para. 5.
195.
David VanderZwaag & Donat Pharand, Inuit and the Ice: Implications for
196.
CanadianArctic Waters, [1983] 21 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 53, 64; see Fisheries Case, 1951
I.C.J. at 133 (discussing economic interests that should be considered).
Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 142. According to Pharand,
197.
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Sea-ice is vital to Inuit culture and way of life. As detailed in a
petition concerning climate change filed by Inuit from Canada and
Alaska with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
Although many Inuit are [now] engaged in wage
employment, the Inuit continue to depend heavily on the
subsistence harvest for food. Traditional "country food"
is far more nutritious than imported "store-bought" food.
Subsistence harvesting also provides spiritual and
cultural affirmation, and is crucial for passing skills,
knowledge and values from one generation to the next,
thus ensuring cultural continuity and vibrancy.
[The Inuit] have developed an intimate relationship with
their surroundings, using their understanding of the
arctic environment to develop a complex culture that has
enabled them to thrive on scarce resources. The culture,
economy and identity of the Inuit as an indigenous
198
people depend upon the ice and snow.
The economic and cultural dependence of the Inuit on the sea-ice
from time immemorial is a critical aspect of Canada's claim over the
waters of its Arctic Archipelago. Again, this fact was emphasized in
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement concluded in 1993 between the
Canadian government and the Inuit, which affirms that "Canada's
sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago is supported by
199
Inuit use and occupancy."

By its very flexible nature, the doctrine of consolidation of title easily
encompasses the vital interests of the coastal State and its inhabitants .... In
the establishment of its straight baseline system by its 1935 decree, Norway
invoked in the preamble the following vital and related interests: . . . 'the
safeguard of the vital interests of the inhabitants of the northernmost parts of
the country.'. .. The Court accepted Norway's arguments, by giving
considerable weight to the 'vital needs of the population of the Lopphavet
region' ....

PHARAND, supra note 20, at 143-44.
198.
SHEILA WATT-CLOUTIER, PETITION TO THE INTER AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS SEEKING RELIEF FROM VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM GLOBAL WARMING
CAUSED BY ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005), available at

http://www.earthjustice.org/libraryflegal-docs/petition-to-the-inter-americancommission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf.
199.
Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, supra note 133, art. 15.1.1(c).
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V. WAS THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE AN INTERNATIONAL
STRAIT BEFORE

1986?

Although a strong case can be made for the legal validity of
Canada's straight baselines and thus for the claim that the waters
they enclose are Canadian internal waters, the Northwest Passage
itself may not have the same status. This is because an existing
international strait cannot be closed off by new baselines. 20 0 As a
result, the crux of the dispute between Canada and the United States
regarding the status of the Northwest Passage concerns the so-called
"functional criterion" and, specifically, whether the Northwest
Passage was "used for international navigation" prior to 1986 when
20 1
Canada drew its baselines.
During the negotiations leading to the 1958 Law of the Sea
Convention, states were unable to agree on a generally acceptable
legal regime for international straits. 20 2 The issue of straits was also
quite divisive during the lead-up to the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, pitting coastal States, particularly in the developing
world, against the maritime powers. 20 3 Although a compromise was
eventually reached as to the nature and scope of the right of passage
that would apply to "straits used for international navigation," the
negotiators were unable to agree on a precise definition for such
straits. 20 4 Consequently, it is necessary to rely on existing customary
by the
international law, particularly as interpreted and applied
205
Case.
Channel
Corfu
the
in
Justice
of
Court
International
In its 1949 judgment, the only international ruling on the issue,
the court had to decide whether the North Corfu Channel was an
international strait.20 6 The court arrived at the conclusion that it
"should be considered as belonging to the class of international
highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal

See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 35 (provides that nothing in the part
200.
affects areas of internal waters within a strait).
See Pharand, supra note 97, at 34-35 (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
201.
1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (Apr. 9)).
202.
See PHARAND, supra note 63, at 89 (describing how a comprehensive set of
provisions on international straits was not adopted until UNCLOS in 1982).
203.
Id.
Part III of UNCLOS essentially incorporated the draft prepared by the
204.
Private Group on Straits (chaired by the United Kingdom and Fiji) and retained the
two criteria identified in article 1 of the draft: "This article applies to any strait (which
term includes any naturally formed stretch of water whatever its geographical name)
which: (a) is used for international navigation; and (b) connects two parts of the high
seas." 4 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS
194 (Platz6der ed., 1982).
205.
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
206.
Id.
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State in time of peace. '20 7 In deciding "whether the test is to be found
in the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in its greater or
lesser importance for the international navigation," the court stated
that "the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as
connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for
20°8
international navigation.
It is in this key passage that the court sets out the twin criteria
that define an international strait: "one pertaining to geography and
the other to the function or use of the strait," to borrow Pharand's
words. 20 9 The court's deliberate use of the coordinative conjunction
"and" seems to give equal weight to both criteria.
While no one disputes that the Northwest Passage fulfills the
geographic criterion by connecting the Atlantic and Arctic oceans,
there has been considerable debate over the precise meaning ascribed
to the functional criterion, namely the words "used for international
navigation." Pharand has argued that the expression means that
"before a strait may be considered international, proof must be
adduced that it has a history as a useful route for international
'210
maritime traffic.
Confirmation for this assessment can be found in the view
expressed by the United Kingdom in its pleadings in the 1951
Norwegian Fisheries Case wherein it defined an international strait
as "any legal strait to which a special r6gime as regards navigation
applies under international law because the strait is substantially
used by shipping proceeding from one part of the high seas to
another. ''21 1 The International Law Commission's draft convention
for the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference similarly confined the right of
non-suspendable innocent passage to straits "normally used for
212
international navigation between two parts of the high seas."
However, the drafters eventually dropped the qualifying adverb
"normally," and it does not appear in either the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention or the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.

213

207.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
208.
209.
Pharand, supra note 97, at 30.
210.
Id. at 35.
211.
Id. at 35 (quoting Reply of the United Kingdom, Fisheries Case (U.K. v.
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. II., at 555 (emphasis added)).
212.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, art. 17, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (July 4, 1956), reprinted in [19561
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 253, 273, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC-1956-v2-e.pdf
(emphasis added).
213.
See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note
172, art. 16, para. 4 (referring to straits used for international navigation without the
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Pharand speculates that the intent behind the deletion of the
word "normally" may simply have been to remove the necessity of
regular use over a very long period. 214 In the Corfu Channel Case,
evidence showed that the British navy had made regular use of the
waterway for some eighty years. 215 Regardless of the precise reasons
for the removal of the word "normally," Pharand insists that before a
strait may be considered international, proof must be presented that
it is an international maritime highway. 216 This conclusion appears
to accord with the interpretation of the Corfu criteria generally given
by experts.
In 1964, Richard Baxter wrote, "[I]nternational waterways must
be considered to be those rivers, canals, and straits which are used to
a substantial extent by the commercial shipping or warships
belonging to states other than the riparian nation or nations. '217 As
for the criteria applied by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, Baxter
concluded that "the test applied by the court lays more emphasis on
'218
the practices of shipping than on geographic necessities.
Daniel O'Connell also emphasized the importance of the "actual
use" criterion:
When it is said, then, that a strait in law is a passage of territorial sea
linking two areas of high sea this is not to be taken literally, but rather
construed as meaning a passage which ordinarily carries the bulk of
international traffic not destined for ports on the relevant coastlines.
The test of what is a strait, unlike the test of what is a bay, is not so
2 19
much geographical, therefore, as functional.

O'Connell later reaffirmed the importance of the functional element
in what is arguably his most authoritative study, The International
Law of the Sea.220 In his opinion, the Corfu Channel Case established
"that not all straits linking two parts of the high seas are
international straits, but only those which are important as
communication links."2 2 '

qualifying adverb "normally"); UNCLOS, supra note 59 (referring to straits used for
international navigation without the qualifying adverb "normally").
214.
PHARAND, supra note 63, at 94.
215.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 29 (Apr. 9).
216.
See Pharand, supra note 97, at 35 (discussing that what was important
about the North Corfu Channel was that it had been a "useful route for international
maritime traffic").
217.
R.R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 3 (1964) (emphasis
added).
218.
Id. at 9.
219.
1 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 497 (I. A. Shearer
ed., 1982) (emphasis added).
220.
Id.
221.
Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
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In what is arguably the most complete modern study of straits in
international law, Hugo Caminos concludes:
The amount of use required of a strait before it can be categorized as
"belonging to a class of international highways through which passage
cannot be prohibited" has never been adequately quantified by
scholarly debate. One could conclude, however, that this amount lies
22 2
somewhere between strict utility and potential utility.

More recently, Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe have considered
the Northwest Passage, along with the Northern Sea Route, to be
situations where there is "real doubt" as to whether an international
strait exists. 2 23 They chose not to analyze the Northwest Passage
because the dispute between Canada and the United States "was
circumvented" by the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, but their
views on the Northern Sea Route would still seem to be of some
relevance: "[T]here are doubts as to whether the straits can be said to
be 'used for international navigation,' and thus attract a right of
transit passage, in the light of the handful of sailings through the
'224
(often ice-bound) straits that have actually taken place.
Despite the general view that a certain level of actual use is
required, voices from within the U.S. military assert that potential
use is sufficient. In 1987, Richard Grunawalt of the U.S. Naval War
College wrote:
Some nations take the view that an actual and substantial use over an
appreciable period of time is the test. Others, including the United
States, place less emphasis on historical use and look instead to the
susceptibility of the strait to international navigation. The latter view
225
has the greater merit.

The last sentence is, of course, an opinion rather than an argument.
Twenty years later, J.C. Kraska of the U.S. Navy asserted that
[t]he test is geographic, not functional-if the water connects one part
of the high seas or EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ, it is a
strait.... [T]here is no authority for the idea that a strait is only a
2 26
strait if it meets a certain minimum threshold of shipping traffic."

222.
Hugh Caminos, The Legal Rdgime of Straits in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, in [1987] 205 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (Acaddmie de Droit
International ed., 1989).
223.
R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 106 (3d ed. 1999).
224.
Id.
225.
R.J. Grunawalt, United States Policy on International Straits, 18 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 445, 456 (1987).
226.
J.C. Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, 22
INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 257, 274 (2007), available at http://www.cdacdai.calcdai/uploads/cdai/2008/12/vimy-paper2.pdf.
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The Canadian media described Kraska's article as having "the full
backing of the Bush administration in Washington. ' 227 However, we
have not been able to find any other country that publicly supports
the U.S. view. Yet again, neither customary international law nor
the only ICJ decision on international straits-the only points of
reference given that the treaties (1958 and 1982 Conventions) do not
give a precise definition of an international strait-support the
"potential use" interpretation.
That said, there is still some debate as to the necessary volume
of traffic. As Pharand reported, the evidence in the Corfu Channel
Case showed that it had been a very useful route for ships flagged by
seven states: Greece, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, Albania,
and the United Kingdom. 2 28 Over a 21-month period, there were
some 2,884 crossings, and this figure covered only those ships which
had put into port and been visited by customs. 229 It did not include
the large number of vessels that had gone through the strait without
calling at the Port of Corfu. 230 "In other words," concluded Pharand,
"the actual use of the North Corfu Channel had been quite
' 23 l
considerable.
In contrast, Pharand was able to document only sixty-nine
transits of the Northwest Passage in the century prior to and
including 2005: twenty small yachts, two tankers, eighteen
icebreakers, and twenty-nine passenger ships. 232 All of the foreign
vessels, including the two tankers and twenty-nine passenger ships
that could be classified as international commercial navigation,
obtained Canada's prior authorization. 233 The only exception was the
Polar Sea in 1985, which, as we have seen, sailed through the
23 4
Passage under an informal agreement to disagree.
It is thus Canada's position that the Northwest Passage does not
fulfill the functional criterion that, together with the geographic
criterion, defines an international strait.235 By drawing straight
baselines in 1986, Canada attempted to preclude the possibility that

227. ' Mike Blanchfield, PentagonAdviser Belittles Canadian Claim to Northwest
NEWS
SERVICE (Ottawa), Feb.
15,
2007, available at
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view-all&address=
389x232736.
228.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 29 (Apr. 9).
229. Id.
230.
Id.
231.
PHARAND, supra note 63, at 93.
232.
Pharand, supra note 97, at 38.
233.
See id. at 38-40 (discussing the documented transits of the Northwest
passage).
234.
See discussion supra text accompanying note 157.
235.
See PHARAND, supra note 20, at 224 (1988) (applying the functional
criterion to the Northwest Passage).
Passage, CANWEST
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the Northwest Passage could eventually become an international
strait.236 And it would have succeeded if the baselines had been
widely recognized. However, as noted, Canada's Arctic baselines
have not received widespread support from other countries; instead,
they immediately attracted diplomatic protests from the United
States and European Community. 237 With the legality of the straight
baselines unresolved, the status of the Northwest Passage remains
uncertain. Consequently, even if the Northwest Passage was not an
international strait before 1986, the position asserted by Canada
when it drew the baselines could, arguably, still be undermined by
non-consensual voyages that, over time, could turn the Northwest
238
Passage into an international strait.
One year before Canada drew its baselines, Pharand warned
that increased international shipping would probably result in the
Three years after the
internationalization of the Passage. 239
baselines were drawn, Howson wrote:
[T]hough at present both the rarity of surface voyages
and the difficulty of navigation through the ice-bound
waters keep international maritime navigation away
from the Northwest Passage, technological advancement
will soon complement geographic potential. Indeed, to a
certain *extent, this has already occurred with rapid
advances in submarine technology. Under either "actual"
or "potential" use standards, the Passage is likely to
become a far more compelling case for the status of an
240
"international strait.
These forecasts did not even take into account the subsequent
sudden, and dramatic loss of sea-ice caused by climate change.
However, Howson's comments do touch on an additional, key
component of the legal puzzle: submarine transits through the
Northwest Passage.

236.

BING BING JIA, THE REGIME OF STRAITS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 7 (1998).

Lieutenant-Commander Guy Killaby, "Great Game In A Cold Climate"
237.
Canada's Arctic Sovereignty in Question, CANADIAN MIL. J., available at
http://www.journal.dnd.calvo6/no4/north-nord-01-eng.asp (last visited Oct. 9. 2009).
See PHARAND, supra note 63, at 110 (arguing that international shipping
238.
may result in the internationalization of the passage). By "non-consensual voyages" we
mean transits through the Northwest Passage by foreign vessels that have not received
prior authorization from the competent Canadian authorities.
PHARAND, supra note 63, at 110.
239.
Howson, supra note 71, at 370-71.
240.
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A. Submarines in the Northwest Passage
Submarine transits are of central importance to understanding
the traditional U.S. position on the Northwest Passage. This is due to
the Arctic Ocean's strategic location between the United States and
Russia and the legal consequences for submarine traffic of regarding
the Passage as anything other than an international strait. For
under the law of the sea, submarines may pass through an
international strait without surfacing or otherwise alerting the
adjacent coastal state or states, something not permitted in internal
241
or (regular) territorial waters.
Nuclear-powered submarines do not require oxygen for
propulsion and are therefore not dependent on the straits and
channels being free of ice. It is widely known, though infrequently
officially acknowledged, that submarines from several countries
regularly traverse the Northwest Passage. 242 Publicly, Canada has
chosen to ignore the issue; it has never possessed a submarine that
could travel under the ice. In 1987, two years after the Polar Sea
incident, the Canadian government decided to acquire ten to twelve
nuclear-powered submarines that could have done so, but pressure
from Washington soon led to the abandonment of that plan. 243 Nor
has Canada made any effort to deploy a surface-based anti-submarine
operation in the area.
Arguably, it works in Canada's favor that the submarines do not
announce their presence. In international law, a country is generally
required to manifest some sense of legal obligation or entitlement
before its actions can contribute to the establishment of a new
right.2 44 At the same time, it seems likely that Canada-a NATO ally

241.
Article 39(1)(c) of UNCLOS requires that "[s]hips and aircraft, while
exercising the right of transit passage, shall ... refrain from any activities other than
those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress." UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 39,
para. 1. As pointed out succinctly by O'Connell, "since submarines are by definition
underwater vehicles, submerged passage is a 'normal mode' of operation for such craft."
O'CONNELL, supra note 219, at 333 (citing William T. Burke, Submerged Passage
Through Straits: Interpretationsof the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text, 52 WASH.
L. REV. 193 (1977)).
242.
This information was obtained by the authors through confidential
interviews with current and former Canadian and U.S. officials, including one former
U.S. submariner who has sailed through the Passage below the ice.
243.
See J.F. Burns, CanadaPlans Big Buildup for its Sub Fleet and Army, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1987, at 1.3 (discussing Canada's announcement to increase military
spending); Philip Shabecoff, Reagan Rejecting Navy's Advice, Promises Canada Sub
Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1988, at Al (discussing opposition from US Navy
officers); Paul Lewis, Military Buildup in Canada Falls Victim to Budget Cuts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1989, at A7 (discussing Canada's decision to scale back its proposed
military buildup).
244.
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 44 (Feb. 20).
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of Britain, France, and the United States-has known about at least
some of the submarine voyages and simply kept quiet. 24 5 Such a
combination of knowledge and acquiescence could prove fatal to
Canada's legal position were evidence of it made public, since this
would establish actual non-consensual usage of the Northwest
246
Passage by international shipping.
However, it is just as likely that any U.S. (and probably NATO)
submarine traffic takes place on a pre-negotiated basis similar to that
If the
set out in the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement. 247
governments sending submarines through the Passage have already
agreed with Canada that the voyages are without prejudice to the
dispute, Canada's legal position will not be affected. 248 It is even
conceivable that permission has regularly been sought and receivedin which case the voyages, if publicly acknowledged, would actually
strengthen Canada's legal position. But the issue of submarine
voyages remains off the table, legally speaking, as long as the
countries involved continue to treat such activity as officially secretas it appears they all intend to do.
Much more apparent and immediately relevant are the
environmental risks presented by commercial surface shipping in a
region where ecosystems are already under acute stress from climate
change.

See Terry Fenge, Submarines and Arctic Sovereignty, GLOBE AND MAIL
245.
(Toronto), Feb. 10, 1996, at D. On June 3, 1995, then-Defence Minister David
Collenette told a parliamentary committee: "I believe we have a novel diplomatic
arrangement with the United States under which they inform us of activities of their
nuclear submarines under the ice, which enables us to at least say they are doing it
with our acquiescence." Id. Fenge also reports that Mr. Collenette repeated this
position in the House of Commons on November 6, 1995, before retracting it in a letter
to Jay Hill, an opposition MP, on January 26, 1996. In the letter, the minister wrote:
There is no formal agreement covering the passage of any nation's submarines
through Canadian Arctic waters. However, as a country that operates
submarines, Canada does receive information on submarine activities from our
Allies. This information is exchanged for operational and safety reasons with
the emphasis on minimizing interference and the possibility of collisions
between submerged submarines.

Id.
See Pharand, supra note 97, at 7 (discussing the necessity, in order to claim
246.
historic title over a maritime area, of imposing authorization requirements on foreign
ships that wish to enter the area).
247.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 136-45; see also Rob Huebert,
248.
Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage, ISUMA CAN. J.
POL'Y RES., Winter 2001, at 86, 89-91, available at http://www.navyleague.caleng/ma/
papersfhuebert-e.pdf (outlining the Canada-US agreements over the Northwest
Passage and their effects on the dispute over the legal status of the passage).
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PROTECTING THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT

The Arctic marine ecosystem is one of the most fragile on
Earth. 249 Arctic species have features and life cycles that reflect an
adaptation to life on and under the sea-ice. 250 Unique forms of algae
and bacteria are active below and in cracks between the sea-ice at
temperatures as low as eight degrees below zero (Fahrenheit). They
are fed upon by miniature crustacean which, in turn, are consumed
by Arctic cod, a species of fish that is able to synthesize antifreeze
proteins in its blood. 251 The cod are in turn preyed upon by ringed
seals, which give birth and nurse their pups in dens inside sea-ice
ridges. 252 The seals then provide the main food source for two
dominant predators: polar bears and the Inuit, both of which are
perfectly adapted to find and kill seals in the whiteness of the pack
ice. 253 The shortness of the food chain, the remarkable specialization
involved, and the near total reliance on a precarious ice-water
balance measured in fractions of a degree of temperature all combine
to make the Arctic marine ecosystem almost uniquely susceptible to
disruption and destruction.
Any shipping involves the danger of accidents, especially in
remote and incompletely charted waters: An oil spill in the Northwest
Passage could cause as much damage as the Exxon Valdez and be
more difficult to clean up. 25 4 Large ships emptying their ballast
tanks as they enter these shallow waters could introduce destructive
foreign species, such as fish parasites or poisonous algae, causing
damage on a scale comparable to what the Zebra Mussel has done to
North America's Great Lakes. 255 Increased shipping could also
disturb mating, birthing, or nursing of whales in key habitats such as
256
Lancaster Sound at the eastern end of the Northwest Passage.

249.
See generally ACIA, supra note 10, at 454-521 (detailing the various
natural and man-made forces that can tamper with the sensitive ecosystem).
250.
Barber et al., supra note 34, at 67.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Id. at 67-68.
254.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill was the most devastating oil spill ever to occur at
sea. See National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration, Prince William's Oily
Mess: A Tale of Recovery, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/stories/oilymess/
welcome.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
255.
See generally Great Lakes Information Network, Zebra Mussels in the
Great Lakes Region, http://www.great-lakes.net/envt/flora-faunaIinvasive/zebra.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (discussing the current research being conducted on the
impact of the Zebra Mussels and various solutions being implemented).
256.
See Susan E. Cosens & Larry P. Dueck, Icebreaker Noise in Lancaster
Sound, N.W.T., Canada:Implications for Marine Mammal Behaviour, 9 MAR. MAMM.
SCI. 227, 285-300 (1993); Sabine Jessen, Canada's True North, Strong and Free - and
Wild, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.cpawsbc.org/node/187 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009)
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The executive summary of the Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment 2009 Report underlines these threats to the Arctic
marine environment:
The most significant threat from ships ... is the release of oil through
accidental or illegal discharge. Additional potential impacts of Arctic
ships include ship strikes on marine mammals, the introduction of alien
species, disruption of migratory patterns of marine mammals and
25 7
anthropogenic noise produced from marine shipping activity.

The environmental risks are of great concern to the Inuit. When we
asked Maria Kripanik, the deputy mayor of Igloolik, about the
possibility of increased shipping through the Northwest Passage, her
first thought was for "our animals. '258 The waters of Foxe Basin, she
explained, are home to beluga whales, ringed seals, and walrus-all
of which the Inuit depend on for food. 259 The Inuit are a maritime
people, as reflected in the fact that all but one of the communities in
Nunavut are located on the seacoast.
Inuit hunters are not merely concerned about the disruption to
marine species and their hunting practices that would inevitably
follow an oil spill. As the AMSA Report highlights, many local Arctic
residents depend on marine resources for subsistence and the local
economy: "[O]ver-the-ice travel and boat transport allow the use of
large marine areas during much of the year. Such life in the Arctic is
dependent on movement over the ice and ocean and sea ice is integral
'260
to this movement.
A. The Need for NationalJurisdiction
The success of efforts to protect the Inuit and their fragile,
already stressed environment could depend, in large part, on whether
the zones being protected fall within Canadian jurisdiction. Most
efforts at protecting the environment within internationalized zones
have had limited success. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing has, in the words of one recent report, "proved stubbornly
resistant to international attempts to control it."' 261 Efforts to protect

(discussing the need to protect arctic species); see also infra text accompanying notes
279-80 (discussion of Lancaster Sound as a possible World Heritage Site).
257.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 4.
258.
Interview with Maria Kripanik, Deputy Mayor, Igloolik, in Igloolik,
Nunavut, Canada (Oct. 24, 2006).
259.
Id.
260.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 4.
261.
Recent studies put the worldwide value of IUU catches between $4 billion
and $9 billion a year, with $1.25 billion coming from the high seas and the remainder
being taken from the exclusive economic zones of coastal States. HIGH SEAS TASK
FORCE, CLOSING THE NET: STOPPING ILLEGAL FISHING ON THE HIGH SEAS 3 (2006),

available at http://www.high-seas.org.
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and stabilize the atmosphere-the thin, life-giving skin of the
planet-have proven similarly ineffective, with the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide increasing from 356 parts per million
(ppm) in 1992 (when the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change was adopted) to 385 ppm in 2008.262
In general, efforts to protect the environment within national
jurisdictions have a better track record-though political will is still
necessary, of course. Canada and the United States have successfully
cooperated to save the whooping crane and other migratory bird
species from extinction, 263 slow the decline in West Coast salmon
265
stocks, 26 4 and protect the biota of trans-boundary lakes and rivers.
But they have only been able to do so because of their unquestioned
authority to regulate activities and enforce compliance within their
266
territories and under their own domestic legal systems.
Some experts have focused on multilateral treaties and codes of
conduct as a way of dealing with the environmental risks posed by
shipping in the Northwest Passage. 26 7
Such an approach can

262.
U.S. Dep't
of Commerce,
National Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration,
Trends
in
Atmospheric
Carbon
DioxideMauna
Loa,
ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.govlccg/co2/trends/co2_annmean_ mlo.txt (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
263.
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United
States, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 16, 1916, T.S. No. 628, available at http://www.treatyaccord.gc.ca/ViewTreaty.asp? Treaty-ID=101587. In Winter 2006/2007, the number of
wild and captive whooping cranes surpassed 500 birds, believed to be the highest
number in a century. See Environment Canada, Whooping Crane: Status and Threats,
http://www.mb.ec.gc.ca/nature/endspecies/whooping/dbOlsO2.en.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2009).
264.
Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, U.S.-Can., Mar. 18, 1985, T.I.A.S. No.
11,091, available at http://www.psc.org/pubsltreaty.pdf (including details on the Pacific
Salmon Commission, the regulatory agency established by the treaty).
265.
Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, T.S. No.
548, available at http://www.ijc.org.
266.
For details on the success of these measures see supra, notes 262-63 and
accompanying text.
267.
See, e.g., Polar Traffic Cops-The Rules for NW Passage Shipping, 27 N.
PERSP. (Canadian Arctic Resource Committee, Ontario, Ottawa, Can.), Spring 2002, at 6,
available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/spring2002/CARC-news-spring-02.pdf (discussing
the current opportunity to set international rules for Arctic marine travel); see also
COMMC'N BUREAU, DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, THE NORTHERN
DIMENSION OF CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2002), available at http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.calcircumpolar/pdf/ndcfp-en.pdf.
Globalization has ... altered the exercise of state sovereignty, partly through
the development of a web of legally binding multilateral agreements, informal
agreements and institutions. In the past, much of Canada's attention to
northern foreign relations has focused on threats to sovereignty. Time has
changed the nature and implication of those threats - cooperation has largely
overshadowed boundary disputes in the North .... To meet new transborder
challenges and further promote co-operation, we will need to intensify dialogue
with existing organizations that undertake common action.
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certainly supplement national powers, but the negotiation of
multilateral instruments involves a complex balancing of many
different interests. In the case of any multilateral instrument dealing
with Arctic shipping, the result would necessarily be a compromise
between shipping and coastal states. As Huebert has explained, "It is
possible that the IMO [International Maritime Organization] may,
ultimately, create a set of standards equal to those developed in
Canada; but, more likely, an internationally established set of
standards would not be as stringent on such issues as environmental
' 268
protection."
For the same reason, multilateral instruments often fail to
provide effective enforcement powers-especially over activities in
internationalized zones. The absence of such powers is most evident
in instruments that are not legally binding, since this precludes
recourse to adjudication or the adoption of "countermeasures" in the
event of non-compliance. 269
For instance, a group of state
representatives spent a number of years negotiating a mandatory
"Polar Code" for shipping under the auspices of the International
Maritime Organization. 270 Before the document was submitted to the
states parties in 2002, however, it was downgraded to a set of
guidelines. 271 Indeed, one of AMSA's key findings is that "[t]here are
no uniform, international standards for ice navigators and for Arctic
safety and survival for seafarers in polar conditions. And, there are
no specifically tailored, mandatory environmental standards
'272
developed by IMO for vessels operating in Arctic waters.
The delay in adopting the Arctic Code is indicative of another
problem with multilateral instruments: They often take considerable
time to negotiate. With sea-ice disappearing so quickly, time is of the
essence. For all these reasons, Canada's claim that the Northwest
Passage constitutes Canadian internal waters provides the best
foundation for effective, enforceable environmental protection.
As it happens, environmental protection has always been a
motivating factor behind Canada's claim. The 1970 Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act represents thirty-eight years of asserted
legislative jurisdiction aimed explicitly at protecting the fragile Arctic
marine environment from the risks posed by international

Id.
268.
Huebert, supra note 41, at 300.
269.
See Huebert, supra note 248, at 92 (reporting that the voluntary nature of
NORDREG suggests Canada questions its own authority to control the Northwest
Passage).
270.
Id. at 87-88.
271.
Id. (reporting that the opposition to a binding instrument came from the
U.S. State Department).
272.
ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 4.
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the stimulus for the

development of treaty law and customary international law
supporting the exercise of a heightened degree of regulatory and
enforcement power by coastal states in ice-covered areas such as the

Northwest Passage.

274

B. Article 234 and InternationalStraits
The adoption of Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea was a major success for Canadian diplomacy. Yet it is
unclear whether the provision applies in international straits, for the
negotiators did not expressly deal with the issue.2 75 Given the
important role of UNCLOS in developing customary international
law, the same uncertainty prevails with regard to any parallel
customary rule. Arguably, this uncertainty, when combined with the
environmental imperative behind the rule, creates a presumption
that ice-covered waterways such as the Northwest Passage are not
international straits, since an international strait in ice-covered
waters that was not subject to strict environmental regulation by the
coastal state would undermine the purpose of both Article 234 and
2 76
any parallel customary rule.
Don McRae goes so far as to argue that the failure of the
UNCLOS negotiators to deal expressly with the application of Article
234 to international straits suggests that they did not consider the
Northwest Passage to fall within this category:
The ice-covered areas provision also affected a careful compromise on
the question of the relationship of the Northwest Passage to the
"international straits" regime under the Convention. There was no
express provision for excluding the Northwest Passage from that
regime, and thus neither the United States nor Canada was required to
However, the intention of the
take a position on the matter.
compromise is readily apparent. The ice-covered areas provision is not
included in the sections of part XII of the Convention that are subject to
the international straits regime. Since the ice-covered areas provision
clearly applies to the Northwest Passage, and since the ice-covered
areas provision is not subject to the international straits regime, ergo
the international straits regime is not applicable to the Northwest
Passage.

277

273.
See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
274.
See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
275.
Don McRae, The Negotiation of Article 234, in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST
PASSAGE 98, 110 (Franklyn Griffiths ed., 1987).
276.

Id.

Id. (citing PHARAND, note 63, at 119-20). Since UNCLOS was negotiated
277.
over a period of eight years, it seems unlikely that the failure to deal expressly with the
application of Article 234 to international straits was an oversight. At the least, it was
an intentional ambiguity that papered over some difference of opinion among the
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However, the possibility that Article 234 does not apply in
international straits provides another good reason for supporting
Canada's position that the Northwest Passage constitutes Canadian
internal waters. The absence of the rights under Article 234, or
comparable or even stronger rights under domestic law, would
seriously compromise efforts to protect the maritime environment in
the Arctic waterway at enormous potential risk to wildlife and the
Inuit.

2 78

Lately, however, Canada has been dragging its heels on the
environmental protection front. For over twenty-five years, Canada
and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) have discussed designating Lancaster
Sound, the principal eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, as a
World Heritage Site. 279 Lancaster Sound is home to endangered
bowhead whales; most of the world's narwhals; one third of North
America's belugas; walrus; polar bears; ringed, bearded, and harp
seals; and millions of seabirds. 280 Designating Lancaster Sound a

negotiating states. On intentional ambiguity generally, see Michael Byers, Agreeing to
Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and Intentional Ambiguity, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 165, 165-86 (2004).
278.
See supra text accompanying notes 263-70.
279.
As a State Party to the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Canada is required to identify the natural sites
of outstanding universal value on its territory. Convention Concerning the Protection
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 3, Nov. 16, 1972, available at
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf. However, nominations to the World
Heritage List are not considered unless the nominated property has previously been
included on the State Party's "tentative list" of the properties it intends to consider for
nomination in subsequent years. State Parties are encouraged to re-examine and resubmit their tentative list at least every ten years. Under Canada's original tentative
list of world heritage sites (1980), Lancaster Sound was included as part of Sirmilik
National Park of Canada (Nunavut). However, this proposal was subsequently
abandoned and Lancaster Sound does not at present appear on Canada's updated
tentative list of world heritage sites (2004). UNESCO World Heritage Centre,
Tentative Lists: Canada, http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/state=ca (last visited
Oct. 9, 2009). The Parks Canada's website, in its section on world heritage and natural
sites, does indicate that the Northwest Passage was considered as a potential site for
the updated tentative list but was ultimately rejected. Parks Canada, Sites Remaining
on the 1980 Tentative List, http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/spm-whs/itm4-/page8-E.asp (last
visited Oct. 9, 2009). There are at present no marine World Heritage Sites in the
Arctic. UNESCO World Heritage Lists, http://whc.unesco.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
For a related proposal to designate Lancaster Sound as a National Marine
Conservation Area, see Jessen, supra note 256. According to Parks Canada, a national
marine conservation area proposal for the Lancaster Sound area was prepared in 1987,
but the feasibility assessment was suspended at the request of the local Inuit. Parks
Canada, Canada's National Marine Conservation Areas System Plan: Lancaster
Sound, http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/amnc-nmca/systemplan/itml-/arc6_E.asp (last visited
Oct. 9, 2009).
280.
See Artic Institute of North America, Eastern Arctic Marine Environmental
Studies Program, 35 ARCTIC 1 (1982), available at http://www.arctic.ucalgary.ca/
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World Heritage Site would, among other things, facilitate efforts to
regulate the routes and frequency of shipping so as to reduce its effect
on those endangered mammals. 28 1 Even if there is no obligation to
take such a measure (and, in our view, there probably is not), doing
so-and having it formally accepted by UNESCO-would support
Canada's claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal
waters subject to Canadian regulation and control. 28 2 However,
successive Canadian governments have never pursued the World
Heritage Site process to completion, apparently because of concerns
that doing so might exacerbate the Northwest Passage dispute with
28 3
the United States.
The less controversial, domestic step of designating Lancaster
Sound as a national marine conservation area-the equivalent of a
national park-has also been delayed for decades, though Inuit
concerns about possible limitations on hunting rights are partly
responsible for this. 2 8 4 In 2007, the federal government allocated $5
million for a five-year study of whether such a conservation area
would be "a practical approach to sustainable management in
Lancaster Sound. '28 5 The answer is probably no, since without the
international recognition that comes with a World Heritage Site
designation, foreign ships might ignore the domestic environmental
protections. 28 6 The creation of a national marine conservation area
should be coupled with a push to secure UNESCO designation,

index.php?page=arctic-contents (this entire issue of the journal relates to the Eastern
Arctic Marine Environment Studies Program, with a focus on Lancaster Sound).
281.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 258 (discussing the effects of
shipping on whales).
One way in which declaring the Northwest Passage a World Heritage Site
282.
would assist in Canada's claim is by furthering their argument that the Inuit's culture
presents a unique "nutritional and cultural dependence," furthering support for
Canada's "non-historical internal water" claim. See supra text accompanying notes
194-99.
283.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-43 (detailing the current fragile
understanding between the United States and Canada); see also supra text
accompanying notes 99-106 (demonstrating how Canada's previous attempts to
explicitly claim a right to the Northwest Passage have elicited opposition from the
United States, disrupting the unspoken compromise).
Parks Canada, supra note 279.
284.
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Health of the Oceans Initiatives-A Listing
285.
by Lead Department or Agency, http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/managementgestionlhealthyoceans-santedesoceans/initiatives-eng.htm#natmarine (last visited Oct.
9, 2009).
Compare World Heritage Centre, Funding, Reporting and Monitoring,
286.
http://whc.unesco.org/en/118/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (detailing the conservation and
monitoring standards of World Heritage Sites), with Huebert, supra note 248, at 90-92
(demonstrating foreign treatment of the Northwest Passage when Canada was
attempting to govern access without international assistance).
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linking the domestic to the international in a mutually supportive
way.
Another example of Canadian government foot-dragging
concerns NORDREG, Canada's maritime registration system in the
Arctic. 28 7 The parallel systems on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of
Canada are mandatory, but the system on Canada's third coast is
not. 28 8 This discrepancy is apparently the result of concerns that
making NORDREG mandatory might provoke a negative response
from the United States. 28 9 Franklyn Griffiths has come to the same
conclusion, and he has made the useful suggestion that making
NORDREG mandatory is consistent with contemporary U.S. concerns
about improving North American security:
At present, reporting by foreign vessels is voluntary in Canada's Arctic
waters and mandatory off the east and west coasts, evidently because of
Canadian defence to longstanding US sensitivities about the status of
the Northwest Passage in law. As a result, Canada does not know as
much as it should about passengers, cargo, and vessel purposes. For
instance, Canadian officials in Resolute do not necessarily have
passenger and crew lists of transiting vessels to check for security
purposes and to recheck against passenger lists on the next flights
south.
Mandatory reporting could, therefore, become part of a
systematic Canadian effort to tighten security against terrorist and
290
other threats in northernmost North America.

In August 2008, during a trip to Inuvik, Northwest Territories,
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that his
government would in fact be making NORDREG mandatory. 291 In
doing so, he expressly anticipated some diplomatic opposition: "It'll be

287.
See Huebert, supra note 248, at 92 (NORDEG is a voluntary not mandatory
reporting system for vessels that enter the Canadian Arctic waters). For information on
NORDREG, see Canada Coast Guard, Vessel Traffic Reporting Artic Canada Traffic
Zone, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/MCTSIVtrArcticCanada (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
288.
See Huebert, supra note 248, at 92 (explaining NORDREG's lack of
enforcement in the Northwest Passage); see also Huebert, supra note 41, at 302-03.
Should the owners of any ship decide to enter Canadian Arctic waters and
decide to take a chance, it is possible to do so without the Canadian
Government being informed.... [Tihe lack of monitoring by the Canadian
Government sends the message that it does not place a high concern regarding
ships entering its northern waters.
289.
See Huebert, supra note 248, at 90-92 (explaining that the United States
has previously opposed all previous Canadian efforts to claim the Northwest Passage
but has not opposed NORDERG so long as it remains voluntary); see also infra text
accompanying note 290.
290.
Franklyn Griffiths, The Shipping News: Canada'sArctic Sovereignty Not on
Thinning Ice, 58 INT'L J., Spring 2003, at 257, 272.
291.
Andrew Mayeda, New Arctic Protection Rules Could be a Tough Sell
Abroad: Harper, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE (Ottawa), Aug. 27, 2008, available at
http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/story.html?id=fOO2Oa5l434f-44f6-8408-8c1d18a67c59.
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interesting to see. I expect that some countries may object," Harper
told reporters. 292 "I think it ultimately is in everybody's interest to
ensure there is some kind of authority in the area, some kind of
environmental and commercial authority.... We have no particular
293
power play here.
After the announcement, a spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in
Ottawa said, "we will be discussing the proposal with Canada. We
will want to ensure that any enhanced protection of the Canadian
Arctic marine environment is achieved in a manner that is consistent
with the international law of the sea. ' 29 4 The prime minister has
delayed instituting his announced regulatory change from that point
onwards.
It is not clear that making NORDREG mandatory would in fact
challenge the U.S. position that the Northwest Passage is an
international strait. As Stuart Kaye explains, Australia obtained
International Maritime Organization support for a compulsory
reporting scheme in Torres Strait (between Australia and Papua New
Guinea) despite that waterway's undisputed status as an
international strait.
It would seem that compulsory reporting does not amount to a
restriction preventing vessels from using an international strait, but
rather it can be construed as a matter relating to international
navigation. While not strictly the designation of sea lanes or a traffic
separation scheme, the reporting procedures are certainly directed
solely at safety of navigation, and have been approved by the
''competent international organization' in the manner outlined in
UNCLOS, Article 41.295
The Government of Canada should pursue the support of the
IMO for a mandatory version of NORDREG and make the change as
soon as possible.

292.
Id.
293.
Id.
294.
Randy Boswell & Andrew Mayeda, U.S. Concerned with New Canadian
Shipping Rules in Arctic, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE (Ottawa), Aug. 28, 2008, available
at http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/story.html?id=ddf03f
21-1628-4659-aeda-52dfe3635085.
295.
Stuart Kaye, Regulation of Navigation in the Torres Strait: Law of the Sea
Issues, in NAVIGATION RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 119, 127
(Donald R. Rothwell & Sam Bateman eds., Kluwer Law International 2000).
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VII. SECURITY CHALLENGES: FROM THE SOVIET UNION
TO GLOBAL TERRORISM

Soviet submarines in the Northwest Passage posed a serious
security threat to both Canada and the United States during the Cold
War. 296 The ice-covered waterway offered the subs an alternate route
between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans-no small attraction given
the amount of NATO attention paid to the Greenland-Iceland-UK
gap. 297 If Canada and the United States had been able to agree that
the Northwest Passage was Canadian internal waters, they would
have had a strong legal basis for excluding the Soviets. But while it
was a given that Canada would always allow American vessels
access, the U.S. Navy was concerned about securing maximum
freedom of navigation worldwide. 298 It worried that recognizing
Canada's claim might create a precedent for coastal state control over
29 9
other contested waterways.
In every other respect, the two NATO allies worked closely
together to counter the Soviets. They built and operated the Distant
Early Warning Line, a string of fifty-eight radar stations stretching
from Alaska to Greenland across the Canadian North and directed at
Soviet bombers (and, later, intercontinental ballistic missiles). 30 0 It is
also well known, though not publicly admitted, that they cooperated
in the deployment of underwater surveillance devices at various
choke points in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. 30 1 In the early
1980s, the Department of National Defence received a federal land
use permit to install a listening device off Skull Point, near the
weather station at Eureka. 30 2 According to Coast Guard personnel,
such missions frequently used Canadian icebreakers. 30 3
More
recently, the Department of National Defence has been working to
replace and improve these systems through the "Northern Watch
Technology Demonstration" project, which involves trials of

296.
Huebert, supra note 41, at 305-06.
297.
See Rob Huebert, Renaissance in CanadianArctic Security? 6 CAN. MIL. J.
17, 19-20 (2005-2006) (discussing the details of Soviet use of Northwest Passage
during the Cold War and Canadian attempts to address the issue).
298.
Huebert, supra note 41, at 305-06.
299.
Id.
300.
See generally RICHARD MORENUS, DEW LINE: DISTANT EARLY WARNING,
THE MIRACLE OF AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE (1957) (detailing the DEW Line's
history and operation).
301.
This information was obtained by the authors through confidential
interviews with former Canadian and U.S. officials.
302.
JOE BALLANTYNE, SOVEREIGNTY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC:
SELECTED EXPLORATION PROGRAMS IN THE 1980S, at 8 (2009).
303.
This information was obtained by the authors through confidential
interviews with Canadian government officials.
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underwater and land-based sensors at Gascoyne Inlet on the north
30 4
shore of Barrow Strait, halfway through the Northwest Passage.
The submarine threat still exists today, but it pales in
comparison to concerns about "rogue states" and terrorist groups
using the Northwest Passage to traffic in weapons of mass
destruction, equipment for enriching nuclear isotopes, and
missiles. 30 5 Unlikely as these risks might seem at first, it is not
difficult to imagine a captain in charge of this kind of cargo choosing
an ice-free, under-policed Northwest Passage over a closely
scrutinized Panama Canal. For this reason, transnational criminal
activity and other threats from non-state actors were central to an
"Arctic Capabilities Study" conducted by the Canadian Directorate of
Defence in 2000.306
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on
September 11, 2001, concerns about global terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs) have greatly increased. In 2003, the
United States led the creation of the Proliferation Security
Initiative. 30 7 This cooperative exercise has seen more than sixty
countries commit to using their existing rights under international
law-within their ports, territorial seas, and on ships carrying their
flags-to prevent the use of the high seas as an avenue for
proliferating WMDs.3 08 Canada is one of the participating countries.
An ice-free Northwest Passage could also serve as an entry point
into North America for drugs, guns, illegal immigrants, and perhaps
even terrorists. Dozens of gravel airstrips are scattered along the
waterway, a forgotten legacy of the Cold War and countless research

304.
Defence Research and Development Canada, Northern Watch Technology
Demonstration-Project
Overview
http://www.ottawa.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/html/project.
overview-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
305.
Michael Byers, Wanted: Mid-Sized Icebreakers, Long-Range Choppers,
Perspective, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 11, 2009; see also ELINOR C. SLOAN,
SECURITY AND DEFENCE: IN THE TERRORIST ERA 80 (2005) (discussing Canada's need to

increase surveillance of the Arctic due to potential terrorist threats); Jim Brown, ExU.S. Envoy Backs Canada's Arctic Claim, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 20, 2007, at A17
(acknowledging the threat in the Northwest Passage).
306.
The report outlines various techniques to increase surveillance of the
Northwest Passage and other Arctic regions in an effort to react to the increased
accessibility of the Arctic region. CANADIAN DIRECTORATE OF DEFENCE, ARCTIC
CAPABILITIES STUDY, 2, 17-18, (2001), available at http://www.natice.noaa.gov/icefree/
Arctic%20Study%2OFinal%20-%2OCanadal.pdf.
307.
U.S. Dep't of State, Proliferation Security Initiative Homepage,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
308.
Id. For more background information on the Proliferation Security
Initiative, see Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security
Initiative,98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526, 526-45 (2004).
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and prospecting expeditions. 30 9 It would be relatively easy to transfer
passengers or cargo from an ocean-going vessel to a small plane for
transfer to another small airstrip further south. Each summer,
cruise ships put hundreds of undocumented foreign nationals on
shore at communities such as Pangnirtung, Pond Inlet, Grise Fjord,
and Resolute Bay, which have scheduled air service but no
310
immigration controls.
Stories of attempted illegal entries abound in Canada's Arctic.
In 1999, the Chinese research icebreaker MV Xu L6ng arrived
unannounced in Tuktoyaktuk. 311 When some of the scientists wanted
to come ashore, an immigration officer had to fly up from Yellowknife
to process them. 312 In September 2006, a Romanian man sailed a
small motorboat from Greenland to Grise Fjord on Ellesmere Island,
hoping to fly from there to Toronto. 3 13 The next month, two Turkish
sailors jumped ship at Churchill, Manitoba, and bought train tickets
to Winnipeg. 314 There is even a regular charter flight from Frankfurt
to Whitehorse that requires the occasional deportation back to
315
Germany from the Yukon.
Having the Northwest Passage recognized as Canadian internal
waters would facilitate efforts to prevent the illegal entry of people
and goods into North America. Within internal waters, the full force
of the coastal state's immigration, customs, and criminal laws apply,
and foreign vessels, crews, passengers, and cargo can be closely
scrutinized. 316 Cargo manifests and crew and passenger lists can be
required in advance, as can visas, in the same manner as on land.
In contrast, the right of transit passage has almost absolute
precedence in an international strait. Under the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, the coastal state may adopt laws concerning "the
loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in
contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws

309.
See Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, http://www.asrc.comnlands/
lands.asp?page=entry (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (provides a list of gravel airstrips that
are closed to public access).
310.
Byers, supra note 305.
311.
Huebert, supra note 248, at 87.
312.
See id. (explaining that local officials in Canada were surprised when the
Chinese research vessel arrived).
313.
Don Martin, Invisible Force in the North; Rangers Guard Sovereignty With
Old Guns, Radios, NAT'L POST (Ontario), Oct. 26, 2007, at A5.
314.
Joe Friesen, Ship-Jumping Sailors Spook Arctic Port, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Oct. 30, 2006, at A13.
315.
See Condor Airlines, Flight Search, http://www9.condor.comltcf-us/index.jsp
(lastvisited Apr. 1, 2009) (showing flights from Frankfurt to Whitehorse). Additional
information was obtained by the authors through a confidential interview with a
Canadian immigration official.
316.
See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art 2 (implying that a coastal state has
complete sovereignty over its internal waters).
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and regulations. '317 Yet even these laws "shall not discriminate in
form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the
practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of
transit passage as defined. 3 1 8 These limitations are significant,
especially for a coastal state seeking to address threats posed by
covert, highly sophisticated groups such as drug cartels and AlQaeda.
In an interview with the Canadian Press wire service in October
2004, then-U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci focused on the security
aspect and admitted that U.S. opposition to the Canadian claim over
the Northwest Passage was not immutable: "We are looking at
everything through the terrorism prism ....
Our top priority is to
stop the terrorists. So perhaps when this . . . is brought to the table
'319
again, we may have to take another look at this.
Later, on March 9, 2005, Cellucci himself wrote on the U.S.
Embassy website:
This has been a longstanding disagreement between the
United States and Canada. However I was asked the
question at the University of Western Ontario by a
student who said, would it not be in the security interests
of North America for the Northwest Passage to be
considered part of Canada and not international waters
because then Canada could keep better track of the
vessels traveling through its waters? I thought the
young man had an excellent question and I have asked
people at the State Department to take a look at this,
particularly because we do live in the age of the terrorist
threat. So it's not a decision for me to make but I have
recommended that we take a serious look at our
3 20
longstanding policy.
We thus know that the State Department has been re-examining the
U.S. position. On October 30, 2006, Cellucci-by this point no longer
U.S. ambassador-went further, expressing what was clearly his
personal opinion. 321 At a conference in Ottawa, he said, "It is in the
security interests of the United States that it [the Northwest

317.
Id. art. 42.
318.
Id.
319.
Greg Younger-Lewis, U.S. Might Be Safer if it Left Northwest Passage to
Canada: U.S. Ambassador, CAN. PRESS NEWSWIRE (Toronto), Oct. 7, 2004.
320.
North of Sixty: US Virtual Presence Posts in Canada, Online dialogue with
Ambassador Cellucci (Mar. 9. 2005), http://www.canadanorth.usvpp.gov/yukonchat.asp.
321.
Daniel Leblanc, U.S. Reasserts its Position on Northwest Passage, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 1, 2006, at A4.
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Passage] be under the control of Canada. '322 We will return to this
important point in the conclusion of this Article.

VIII. CANADA'S ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY IN
THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE

For Canada and the United States, shared security concerns
necessitate a real and effective presence in the Northwest Passage.
For Canada, environmental concerns contribute to the same
imperative, as does the need to provide search-and-rescue, navigation
assistance, and icebreaking for commercial vessels. Canada also
needs to be present to prevent unauthorized crossings by foreign
vessels, since any such voyages would weaken its legal claim, a
consequence detrimental to itself, the United States, other
responsible countries, and reputable shipping companies.
Yet Canada is poorly equipped to police the Northwest Passage.
Despite the effects of climate change, the Coast Guard's relatively
light icebreakers still cannot operate in the Northwest Passage in
winter; they are redeployed to the Gulf of St. Lawrence each
autumn. 323 The ships are also growing old: The largest ship, the
Louis S. St. Laurent, was built in 1967, and the Amundsen is just a
324
decade younger.
In 1985, after the voyage of the Polar Sea, the Canadian
government announced that it would build a powerful, all-season
icebreaker, the Polar 8.325 However, four years later it cancelled the
contract, citing the need for fiscal restraint. 326 Despite subsequent

Id. Cellucci repeated the point on August 19, 2007 in an interview with
322.
CTV's Question Period: "I think, in the age of terrorism, it's in our security interests
that the Northwest Passage be considered part of Canada," he said. 'That would enable
the Canadian navy to intercept and board vessels in the Northwest Passage to make
sure they're not trying to bring weapons of mass destruction into North America." Jim
Brown, supra note 305.
For information on the Canadian Coast Guard's icebreaking program, see
323.
Canadian Coast Guard, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/ice-gla/main-e.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2009).
324.
Beaufort Gyre Exploration Project, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute,
http://www.whoi.edulbeaufortgyre/icebreaker.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009); CCGS
http://www.amundsen.quebecIcebreaker,
Research
Canadian
Admundsen:
ocean.ulaval.calamundsenenglish.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
Randy Boswell, Short-Sighted Politics, Forgotten Arctic Dreams; The
325.
Abandoned Polar 8 Icebreaker Ship Could Have Embodied Canada's Identity as a
CircumpolarPower, OTTAWA CITIZEN, August 10, 2007, at A5.
Id. ("[Iun February 1990, Mr. Mulroney's finance minister, Michael Wilson,
326.
announced the death of Canada's polar ship of state, declaring it strategically obsolete
and economically unjustified.").
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years of federal surpluses, the government has not built any new
32 7
icebreakers in the following two decades.
In November 2005, then-Opposition Leader Stephen Harper
seized on Arctic sovereignty as an election issue. He promised three
armed heavy icebreakers, a deep-water port on Baffin Island,
underwater sensors, and Arctic-trained paratroopers. 328
To his
credit, he has followed up on several of these promises and has taken
329
some unexpected steps as well.

The first unexpected step came in May 2006, when the functions
of the bilateral U.S.-Canada North American Aerospace Defence
Command were expanded to include surveillance over maritime
approaches and "internal waterways. '330
During the House of
Commons debate on the matter, then-Defence Minister Denis
O'Connor was asked whether the Northwest Passage was included

327.

Id.

22 years after former foreign affairs minister Joe Clark committed to spending
$500 million to build the Polar 8 ...the country will wait at least another five
years for the delivery of Mr. Harper's newly promised $3-billion fleet of limitedrange Arctic patrol boats, none with the all-weather capabilities or symbolic
power of the Polar 8.
Id.
328.
On December 22, 2005, Harper announced a "Canada First" northern
strategy that included:
Stationing three new armed naval heavy ice breakers in the area of Iqaluit
which will include 500 regular force personnel for crews and support; Building
a new military/civilian deep-water docking facility in the Iqaluit area;
Establishing a new Arctic National Sensor System for northern waters which
will include underwater surveillance technologies; Building a new Arctic army
training centre in the area of Cambridge Bay on the Northwest Passage staffed
by an estimated 100 regular force personnel; Stationing new fixed-wing searchand-rescue aircraft in Yellowknife; Providing eastern and western Arctic air
surveillance through stationing new long range uninhabited aerial vehicle
(UAV) squadrons at CFB Goose Bay and CFB Comox; Revitalizing the
Canadian Rangers by recruiting up to 500 additional Rangers, increasing their
level of training, activity, and equipment; and Providing an army emergency
response capability through the new airborne battalion and airlift capacity
stationed at CFB Trenton to provide a rapid emergency response capability
throughout the entire Arctic region.
Military Muscle: Experts stress the importance of answering Arctic sovereignty questions
sooner rather than later, CAN. GEOGRAPHIC, Mar.-Apr. 2006, available at
http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/magazine/ma06/indepth/place sidebar.asp.
329.
HarperAnnounces Northern Deep-Sea Port, TrainingSite, CBC NEWS, Aug.
11, 2007, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/10/port-north.html.
330.
Agreement on the North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S.Can., Apr.
28, 2006, available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.caltext-texte.
asp?id=105060; see also National Defence and the Canadian Forces, NORAD,
Backgrounder, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news.nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvell
es-eng.asp?id=1922 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (providing background of NORAD).
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O'Connor initially
within the proposed new arrangement. 331
indicated that it was not, but he rose the next week on a point of
332
order to correct the assertion.
The public agreement to share maritime surveillance within the
Northwest Passage reinforces a longstanding practice. Again, it is
well known, though not publicly acknowledged, that acoustic devices
were placed in the waterway during the Cold War, with full Canadian
cooperation. 333 The fact that Canada is now developing its own
acoustic capabilities reflects the age of those existing devices rather
than any falling out between the two countries. 334 Indeed, it is
possible that the development of a purely Canadian capability was
what prompted the expansion of the NORAD agreement.
The second unexpected step came in July 2007, when Stephen
Harper announced that six to eight ice-strengthened Arctic Offshore

331.
15 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (HANSARD) 1870, 39th Parl., 1st Sess.
(daily ed. May 3, 2006) (statement of Godon O'Connor, Minister of Defense) (Can.),
available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=hansard&
mee=16&parl=39&sess=l&language=E&Docid=2174969&File=O.
332.
16 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (HANSARD) 1455, 39th Parl.,1st Sess.
(daily ed. May 3, 2006) (statement of Gordon O'Connor, Minister of Defense) (Can.),
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1l/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/016_2006-0504/HAN016-E.htm, Mr. O'Connor stated:
Mr. Speaker, in the Norad agreement we will share information about vessels
going through the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway. We will not for
the Northwest Passage or for our lakes or waters. Those are all our internal
waters. We do not share that with the United States.
Id. 18 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (HANSARD) 1500, 39th Parl.,lst Sess. (daily ed.
May 8, 2006) (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/chambus/house/
debates/018_2006-05-08/HAN018-E.htm. O'Connor stated:
Mr. Speaker, I would like to clarify the remarks I made in question period on
Thursday, May 4. My remarks were in response to a question about Norad's
information sharing. The maritime aspect of the agreement will give Norad
access to data that has been shared between security and defence agencies in
North America for several decades. This applies to all Canadian and U.S.
waters, including internal waters. Therefore, Canadian internal waters in the
Arctic archipelago would also be covered by this agreement. This is nothing
new. We already share this type of information with the U.S. The Norad
agreement will allow us to better manage this activity. In no way will this
provision weaken our sovereignty. Any decision about action in Canadian
internal waters will remain Canada's alone.
Id.
This information was obtained by the authors through confidential
333.
interviews with former Canadian and U.S. officials.
334.
Peter Calamai, Keeping Tabs on the Arctic: As the North Becomes
IncreasinglyAccessible, Stakeholders Focus on How to Control It, TORONTO STAR, Dec.
16, 2007, at A6.
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Patrol Ships would be built for the Canadian Navy. 3 35 The ships will
have some protection against ice, but they are not designed to break
it and, for this reason, will not be deployed in the Northwest Passage
for most of each year. 336 They will, however, be useful in the Gulf of
St. Lawrence, on the Great Lakes, and even in Hudson Bay and
Baffin Bay. A senior Canadian Forces officer has confirmed that the
military regards the patrol vessels primarily as replacements for the
existing Kingston class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels used on
Canada's Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, which have no ice3 37
strengthening at all.
In August 2007, Harper announced that an existing deepwater
wharf at a disused lead and zinc mine at Nanisivik, on northern
Baffin Island, would be refurbished to provide an enhanced refuelling
facility for Canadian naval and Coast Guard vessels close to the
Northwest Passage. 338 Political leaders in Nunavut, who had lobbied
hard for a similar facility at Iqaluit, on southern Baffin Island, in
order to boost economic development and reduce the high cost of
339
living there, met the decision with dismay.
The Prime Minister also announced an expansion of the
Canadian Ranger program to 5,000 personnel. 340
The program
currently includes 4,100 part-time reservists-many of them Inuit,
Inuvialuit, or First Nations-who live in 165 hamlets stretching from
Baffin Island to the Alaskan frontier.3 4 1 The Rangers, who are
equipped with snowmobiles and old, reliable bolt-action rifles, fulfill
essential search-and-rescue and surveillance functions close to where
they live. 342 They also teach regular Canadian Forces personnel how
to survive and travel on the land, especially in winter, and sometimes

335.
Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Can., Speech at Esquimalt, B.C. (July 9,
2007), available at http:l/pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1741.
336.
David Pugliese, Tories to Spend $3.1B on Arctic Fleet, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
July 10, 2007, at Al.
337.
DVD: Captain (N) Serge Bertrand, Chief of Staff, Maritime Staff
Headquarters, Presentation at U.N.T.D. Rendezvous Ottawa, Senate of Canada (Oct.
20, 2007) (on file with authors).
338.
See Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Can., Speech at Resolute Bay, Nun.
(Aug. 10, 2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1787.
339.
John Thompson, Deep Port Moving Closer to Reality? NUNATSIAQ NEWS,
Feb. 3, 2006, available at http:/lwww.nunatsiaqnews.com/archives/60203/news/
nunavut/60203_03.html; Chris Windeyer, It's Official: Nanisivik New Port Site,
NUNATSIAQ NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/
20071708170817/news/nunavut/70817_414.html.
340.
Harper, supra note 338.
341.
See Canadian Rangers, http:llwww.army.forces.gc.calland-terre/cr-rc/indexeng.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (providing general information on the Canadian
Rangers).
342.
See Canadian Rangers, FAQ, http://www.army.forces.gc.calland-terre/crrc/faq-eng.asp#02 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (explaining what Canadian Rangers do and
what equipment they are provided).
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lead them on sovereignty ops across the ice and tundra. 343 However,
the expanse in which the Rangers operate dwarfs their abilities, and
they are neither equipped nor trained to forcibly board ocean-going
vessels.
The most significant contribution the Harper government has
made to Arctic sovereignty concerns a remote sensing satellite,
Radarsat-2.
The satellite, owned by MacDonald Dettwiler and
Associates (MDA, a private Canadian-owned company), was launched
from Kazakhstan in December 2007. 344 Canadian taxpayers were the
primary source of funding for the satellite, which generates high
3 45
definition imagery on demand, even at night and through clouds.
Radarsat-2, designed specifically with the Arctic in mind, is useful for
monitoring crops and forests, coordinating disaster relief operations,
and supporting fisheries enforcement. 346 In a polar orbit 500 miles
above the Earth's surface, it is the perfect tool for tracking ships,
mapping sea-ice (including during the long, dark polar winter), and
even-rumor
has
it-detecting
the
wakes
of submerged
347
submarines.
Radarsat-2 was not, however, an initiative of the Harper
government, having been built and funded during the Liberal
government of Jean Chr~tien. 348
Moreover, there are possible
constraints on Canada's use of the satellite, including an unpublished
"annex" to a bilateral treaty that was concluded in 2000 after the
United States expressed concern that hostile countries or groups
might be able to purchase revealing images of its military facilities

343.
See Canadian Rangers, supra note 341 (describing the tasks of Canadian
Rangers).
344.
B. Constantineau, MDA Breathes Easy with Satellite Launch, VANCOUVER
SUN, Dec. 15, 2007, available at http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/
business/story.html?id=bceb32a3-3104-44d1-9le9-5ffd8a881297.
345.
See id. (discussing how much was spent on satellite and its improvements
on previous satellites).
346.
Canadian Space Agency, Radarstat-2 Applications, http://www.espace.gc.ca/
asc/eng/satellites/radarsat2/applications.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
347.
This information was obtained by the authors through a confidential
interview with an MDA employee.
348.
See Canadian Library and Archives, First Among Equals: The Prime
Minister in Canadian Life and Politics, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/
premiersministres/h4-3000-e.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (listing former Prime
Minister Chretien's time in office as being from November 4, 1993 to December 12,
2003); Canadian Space Agency, Canadian Space Milestones, http://www.asccsa.gc.caleng/about/milestones.asp#1998, (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (detailing the
timeline of RADARSAT-2's development, beginning February 27, 1998 when the
Canadian Space Agency selected a private company to build the satellite and invested
$225 million into the program).
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and forces. 3 49 Washington undoubtedly obtained control of any
images of U.S. bases and real or potential theatres of operation, such
as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. 3 50 It may also have secured the
power to conscript Radarsat-2 in support of its intelligence and
military operations. 351
In

January

2008,

MDA

announced

plans

to

sell its

space

to Alliant Techsystems
of
division, including Radarsat-2,
Minnesota. 3 52 The proposed sale, and its possible effects on Canada's
ability to obtain fine imagery of the Northwest Passage on demand,
sparked a firestorm of criticism in Canada. 353 In response, the
Harper government extended by thirty days the period for
considering the proposed sale under the Investment Canada Act354
and then blocked the sale.
In February 2008, more than two years after Harper promised

three new icebreakers, an item appeared in the Canadian federal

budget for a large and powerful $720 million icebreaker.3 55 Rather
than being a naval vessel, the new icebreaker is destined for the

Coast Guard, which uses its ships as multipurpose platforms: to clear
paths for other ships; maintain navigation devices; provide search
and rescue; support research scientists; and assist in the enforcement

of fishing and environmental regulations as well as immigration,

349.
Richard Sanders, Canada:A World Leader in the Militarisationof Space,
ACTIVIST,
Mar.
2006,
available
at
http://activistmagazine.com/
THE
index.php?option=content& task=view&id=796&Itemid=143.
350.
Id.
351.
MICHAEL BYERS, INTENT FOR A NATION: WHAT IS CANADA FOR? 183-88
(2007).
352.
Steven Chase, Deal Includes Key Satellite, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan.
10, 2008, at B1.
353.
See Scott Brison & Michael Byers, Keep Radarsat-2in Canada, NATIONAL
POST, March 24, 2008, at All(discussing why sale is a bad idea); Editorial, Keep Our
Satellite in Canada, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 27, 2008, at A14 (discussing concerns of
proposed sale); John Polanyi, Our Eyes on the World; The Sale of MDA's Space Unit is
Shortsighted and Should Not Be Approved by Ottawa, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Mar.
18, 2008, at A19 (discussing the decision not to approve the sale of MDA).
354.
See Brison & Byers, supra note 353, at All (discussing government's
decision to take an extra 30 days); Michael Byers, For Sale: Arctic Sovereignty?, THE
WALRUS (Toronto), June 2008, available at http://www.walrusmagazine.com/
articles/2008.06-technology-for-sale-arctic-sovereignty-radarsat-mda-michael-byers/
(explaining why taking an extra 30 days was a good idea); Andrew Mayeda & Randy
Boswell, Part 2. Tough Talks into National Pride, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 16,
2008, available at
http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/features/arcticambitions/
story.html?id=352b8bf7-b6b3-46a3-8334-29712adb43ce (explaining that the sale was
ultimately blocked).
Bob Weber, Budget's 'Anywhere, Anytime' Icebreaker Welcomed, If It Gets
355.
27,
2008,
available at
Built: Experts,
EAST
OTTAWA
STAR,
Feb.
http://www.eastottawa.ca/article-cp97865034-Budgets-anywhere-any-time-icebreakerwelcomed-if-it-gets-builtexperts.html.
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customs, and criminal laws.3 56 However, the icebreaker is not due to
be operational until 2017, by which point the latest scientific
projections suggest the Arctic may already have experienced a
complete summer melt-out of sea-ice. 357 As a result, the main
obstacle to shipping-thick, hard "multi-year" ice-will have
disappeared. From that point onwards, the Northwest Passage will
resemble the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where mid-sized icebreakers are
sufficient, and the planned vessel may be overkill.
Surprisingly, the Harper government has paid almost no
attention to the military's most important function in the Arctic,
namely search-and-rescue. Four old, slow Twin Otter aircraft based
in Yellowknife constitute the entirety of the Canadian Forces Arctic
fleet. C-130 Hercules cargo planes based in Trenton, Ontario, used for
most of the serious search-and-rescues, take six hours to reach the
Northwest Passage and, once there, can only drop search-and-rescue
technicians (SAR-techs), rather than hoist anyone on board. 358 "None
of the Canadian Forces' Cormorant search-and-rescue helicopters is
Arctic-based, not even in summer. ' 359
Helicopters have to be
deployed on specific missions from southern locations, as was the case
in February 2007, when'an aircraft from Comox, in southwestern
British Columbia, flew thousands of miles to rescue an Inuvialuit
hunter trapped on an ice-flow at the western end of the Northwest
36 0
Passage.
Increased shipping will likely result in an increased number of
accidents, many of them in isolated locations and cold temperatures.
Cruise ships are a particular concern because of the large number of
older passengers often on board. When the German-owned Hanseatic
went aground near Cambridge Bay in 1996, all of the passengers had
to be evacuated. 361 In November of 2007, the Canadian-owned M/V

356. Canadian Coast Guard, Our Fleet, http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.caleng/CCG/
Our-Fleet (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
357.
David Shukman, Arctic to be 'Ice-free' in Summer, BBC NEWS, Oct. 14,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8307272.stm
(suggesting that "the
Arctic Ocean could be largely ice-free ... in as little as ten years time").
358.
Michael Byers, Professor and Can. Research Chair of the University of
B.C., Testimony Before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Canadian House
of Commons, 2nd Sess., 40th Parliament (June 2, 2009), available at
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3948396&Language
=E&Mode=l&Parl=40&Ses=2; see, e.g., Joe Friesen, Heroes From the Sky, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 20, 2007, at Al (stating that it took more than 6 hours for
Canadian Forces C-130 Hercules to go from Winnipeg to the Northwest Passage).
359.
Id.
360.
See Friesen, supra note 358, at Al (helicopter dispatched from Winnipeg).
361.
See F. McCague, High Arctic Grips a Cruise Ship: Hundreds Evacuate by
Dinghies as Tugs Try to Free the Hanseatic, 23 ALBERTA REP. 15, Sept. 16, 1996,
(describing the event); see also Global Process, Community Impact, N. PERSP.
(Canadian Arctic Res. Comm., Ottawa, Ont.), Spring 2002, at 8, available at
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Explorer sank during an Antarctic voyage after hitting a small
iceberg; fortunately, the sea was calm, two other cruise ships were
close by, and all the crew and passengers survived.3 62 The M/V
Explorer, a frequent visitor to Arctic waters, could just as easily have
sunk in the Northwest Passage in rough seas with no help within
hours or days.
Search-and-rescue is also needed for airplane accidents, some of
which could require large-scale deployment. In 1991, a Canadian
Forces Hercules crashed twelve miles from Canadian Forces Station
Alert on Ellesmere Island, killing five of the eighteen passengers and
crew. 363 The thirteen survivors endured two days in a raging blizzard
before a search-and-rescue team from southern Canada could reach
them. 364 More than 90,000 commercial flights take "trans-polar" or
3 65
The
"high latitude" routes over Canadian territory each year.
High
in
the
crash-landing
A-340
prospect of a Boeing 777 or Airbus
Arctic is terrifying, even if the reliability of such aircraft means the
risk is very low.
Improving search-and-rescue capacity in the Northwest Passage
would also facilitate the enforcement of Canadian laws and thus the
credibility of Canada's legal position. A long-range helicopter is the
perfect platform for boarding ocean-going cargo vessels. Basing one
or more of these aircraft in the North, initially during the summer
months, would constitute an important part of any serious policy
aimed at enforcing Canada's Northwest Passage claim. As Pharand
told Canada's Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans,
"[T]he United States will never agree to recognize our full control
to
over those waters unless they know that we have the capability 366
exercise that control, which we do not have at the moment.
Indeed, from a U.S. perspective, Canadian sovereignty combined with

http://www.carc.org/pubs/spring2002/CARC-news-spring-02.pdf (describing another
incident involving a foreign sailboat which turned up during the summer of 2001 near
Coal Harbour and noting that when boat became stuck, "nobody was available to
help.").
362.
Moira Welsh & Emily Mathieu, CanadianShip Lost in Antarctic, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 24, 2007, available at http://www.thestar.comlNewsfWorld/article/279492.
363.
Clyde H. Farnsworth, After a Plane Crash, 30 Deadly Hours in the Arctic,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at AS, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/05/
worldlafter-a-plane-crash-30-deadly-hours-in-the-arctic.html.
13 Rescued Near North Pole after Plane Crash in Blizzard, N.Y. TIMES,
364.
Nov. 2, 1991, at 1.2.
The Defenceless Arctic, N. PERSP. (Canadian Arctic Res. Comm., Ottawa,
365.
Ont.), Spring 2002, at 13, available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/spring2002/CARCnews-spring_02.pdf.
STANDING SENATE COMM. ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS, THE SENATE OF
366.
CANADA, RISING TO THE ARCTIC CHALLENGE: REPORT ON THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD

27 (2009), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/4O/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/fishe/rep-e/rep02may09-e.pdf.
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a lack of enforcement capacity might be worse than a waterway that
was wide-open to all. For in an international strait, the United
States could at least exert a military presence and, based on the
inherent right of self-defense, interdict vessels posing an imminent
367
threat to itself or its citizens.
A demonstrated Canadian commitment to policing the
Northwest Passage-in the form of actual equipment, infrastructure,
and personnel-is a necessary part of any diplomatic effort to resolve
the legal dispute. Prime Minister Harper has made promises that
could help take Canada there; now, his government needs to deliverincluding by initiating discussions with Washington.

IX.

DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS

There are experts who believe that it would not be in Canada's
interest to press its Northwest Passage claim. 368 Franklyn Griffiths
argues that Ottawa and Washington could just muddle through,
disagreeing on the law but cooperating on the practicalities of North
American defense and economic development. 369 Indeed, he suggests
that the United States' willingness to acquiesce to a de facto increase
in Canadian control-a consequence of greater concern for homeland
security and continental defence offsetting the historical need for
naval mobility in distant regions-might be undermined by an
attempt to open negotiations on the matter, since this would be to
"pick a fight with the U.S. Navy. ' 370 He even posits that
third parties are unlikely to challenge Canada over the enforcement of
Canadian environmental and other laws on foreign commercial vessels
in the Archipelago. The third party that took Canada to the World
Court would offer a challenge not only Canada, but also the U.S. This
it would do in threatening to breach the North American security
perimeter by urging an adjudication that ran an international strait
37 1
through the northernmost part of the continent.

367.

See U.N. Charter art. 51 (preserving the "inherent right of individual or

collective self-defence"); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE

86-88 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the ideological split of states in their interpretation of
"inherent right" of self defense).
368.
See e.g., Franklyn Griffiths, Our Arctic Sovereignty is Well in Hand, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 8, 2006, at A25 (arguing that it is in Canada's best interest
not to pursue its claim to the Northwest Passage).
369.
Id.; see also Griffiths, supra note 290, at 257 (revealing an earlier
expression of the same view, and some now patently incorrect predictions as to the
limited impact of climate change on sea-ice).
370.
Griffiths, supra note 368.
371.
Id.

1200

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1133

This is an optimistic view for a number of reasons. First, rising
temperatures and energy prices seem destined to make the
Northwest Passage an important shipping route-including all the
environmental and security challenges this will bring. Second, the
U.S. Navy is sometimes amenable to changing its positions, as
demonstrated by the fact that it now supports U.S. ratification of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 3 72 Third, it is not clear that
all third parties will engage in complex calculations of U.S. interests
or defer to them. Neighbours and allies might be willing to cooperate
while agreeing to disagree, but what about North Korea or Al-Qaeda?
Fourth, adjudication is not the only way that Canada's position could
be lost. One also needs to ask whether the United States and other
countries would look the other way if Canada interdicted a cargo
ship-flying a flag of convenience-that entered the Passage without
permission. Just a handful of protests, particularly from countries
with special interests in the Arctic, could seriously damage Canada's
claim.
Other experts, including some within the Canadian Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, argue that the status of
the Northwest Passage is not so important because, even if it were an
international strait, Canada already enjoys all the rights and
privileges needed for responsible stewardship.3 73 There are several
strands to this argument, all of which are problematic. First, it is
sometimes suggested that, although Canadian jurisdiction within the
Northwest Passage may be limited by the international straits
regime, it is not so limited in the approaches to the waterway-where
the full force of Article 234 of UNCLOS and the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act applies. 3 74
However, this suggestion
conflicts with the official U.S. government position that "transit
'3 75
It
passage also applies in the approaches to international straits.
also seems inconsistent with common sense, since the right of transit
passage within an international strait would be rendered
meaningless if a different, more stringent legal regime applied to the
approaches.
Second, the argument sidesteps the question of whether Article
234 will apply to waters that, while once ice-covered for most of the
year, are progressively rendered ice-free for many months on end.
There is nothing in Article 234 to suggest that waters that are subject

372.
Military Officials Urge Accession to Law of Sea Treaty, FINANCIAL TIMES
LIMTIED (Washington D.C.), Dec. 10, 2007.
373.
J.L. Granatstein, Comment, Does the Northwest Passage Still Matter?,
GLOBE
AND
MAIL
(Toronto),
Jan.
12,
2009,
at All,
available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.comnnews/opinions/article965180.ece.
374.
UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 234 (no mention of international straits).
375.
ROACH & SMITH, supra note 87, at 65.
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to greater pollution prevention jurisdiction, because they are covered
with ice for most of the year, retain that status if and when the ice
disappears for lengthy periods. 3 76 The rights accorded under Article
234 are not vested in the strait itself on an indeterminable basis but
377
flow from the character of the ocean's surface there.
Third, the argument does not address the issues of whether (1)
Article 234 allows Canada to interdict a vessel that is non-compliant
with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act; or (2) enforcement
powers are restricted to the period after a pollution incident occurs.
Hugh Caminos' discussion of the application of Article 233-a
provision which allows for a more limited degree of pollution
prevention jurisdiction in non-ice covered waters-to international
straits illustrates the seriousness of the issue:
In order for a State bordering a strait to take any enforcement
measures under Article 233, there must first be a direct nexus between
the transiting vessels' violation of Article 42(1)(a) or (b), and the
resulting major damage to the marine environment of the strait in
question. The mere fact [that] a State's laws and regulations enacted
pursuant to Article 42 have been breached, does not ipso facto entitle
that State to act under Article 233. If actual damage to the marine
environment has already resulted, and it can be linked to a vessel's
illegal actions, then the "States bordering the straits may take
378
appropriate enforcement measures."

Mary George comes to an even more restrictive conclusion, arguing
that "transit passage cannot be interfered with and ... appropriate
enforcement measures cannot be imposed on user States when in
'379
breach of a strait State pollution regulation.
There is similar uncertainty as to the extent of legislative and
enforcement jurisdiction a coastal state can exercise in an
international strait for national security reasons. Although Article 39
of UNCLOS states that ships and aircraft, while exercising the right
of transit passage, shall "refrain from any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of States bordering the strait" and "from any activities other than
those incidental to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious
transit," nowhere does the Convention specify what the coastal state

376.
See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 234 (failing to discuss retention of status
if ice disappears).
377.
See id. (applying only to ice covered areas).
Caminos, supra note 222, at 172 (emphasis added).
378.
Mary George, The Regulation of Maritime Traffic in Straits Used for
379.
International Navigation, in OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESPONSES 38 (Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R.

Rothwell eds., 2004); see also id. at 24 ("[Ilt would be difficult for a strait State to give
effect to the laws and regulations adopted under article 42(1) without infringing the
limitations in article 42(2) against 'hampering or impairing the right of transit
passage."').

1202

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1133

may do in the event of such action. 380 To the contrary, Article 44
simply stipulates that "States bordering straits shall not hamper
transit passage and shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to
navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which they have
knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit passage."38 1 As
Stuart Kaye has rightly concluded, "Coastal State rights applicable to
'382
transiting vessels are very limited.
The Proliferation Security Initiative does not deal with the issue
of international straits at all, thus implicitly suggesting that they are
to be treated as high seas for its purposes. The PSI "statement of
interdiction principles" calls upon PSI participants to
take appropriate actions to . . . stop and/or search in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels
that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes [of WVMD, their
delivery systems, or related materials] to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are
identified.

383

Again, the new challenges arising in the Northwest Passage due to
climate change can only adequately and definitively be addressed by
applying the full range and rigour of a domestic legal system's
environmental, immigration, customs, and criminal laws. As it
happens, the Canadian domestic legal system is the only national
legal system plausibly available within the waters of the Canadian
archipelago. The Canadian government should therefore initiate
negotiations with other countries-particularly the United Statesaimed at securing widespread recognition of this reality. Any other
approach entails risks that cannot responsibly be tolerated, even if it
has the short term attraction of requiring little or nothing in terms of
policy change.

X. U.S. NAVIGATION INTERESTS

The interests of the United States in the Northwest Passage
have changed. Today, Washington is less concerned about Russian
submarines than about terrorists finding a backdoor to North
America or rogue states using the oceans to transport missiles and
WMD. In the Arctic, these new threats would best be dealt with by a
strengthened Canadian military and Coast Guard applying the full

UNCLOS, supranote 59, art. 39.
380.
Id. art. 44.
381.
382.
KAYE, supranote 295, at 123.
U.S. Dep't of State, Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security
383.
Initiative (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.state.gov/t/isnlc27726.htm; see also Byers, supra
note 308, at 530 (discussing the Proliferation Security Initiative).
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force of Canadian domestic law. It simply does not benefit the United
States-nor other responsible countries and reputable shipping
companies-to have foreign vessels shielded from scrutiny and
reasonable regulations by maintaining that the Northwest Passage is
an international strait.
Access to the waterway is not really an issue, since Canada
would never deny entry to one of its allies or a reputable shipping
company. In 1969, then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that
"to close off those waters and to deny passage to all foreign vessels in
the name of Canadian sovereignty . . . would be as senseless as
placing barriers across the entrances of Halifax and Vancouver
harbours. ''38 4 Moreover, Canada and the United States are close
partners in the shared defence of North America, whether at the level
of border security, NATO, or the North American Aerospace Defence
Command (again, with the scope of the latter organization having
recently been expanded to encompass maritime surveillance,
38 5
including over the Northwest Passage).
Although American officials and academics sometimes express
sympathy for Canadian concerns about the Northwest Passage, they
invariably see an insurmountable obstacle to any change in the U.S.
position that recognizing Canada's claim could jeopardize U.S. access
to key waterways in other parts of the world. The concept of the
freedom of the seas and the strategic mobility it provides has long
been the cornerstone of American policy. The worry is that, if the
United States "gives in" over the Passage, countries bordering other
straits and channels will feel justified in arbitrarily imposing their
own conditions and requirements for navigation.38 6 In other words,
saying "yes" to Canada could create a dangerous precedent.

384.
Suzanne
Lalonde,
Artic
Waters:
Cooperation
or
Conflict?,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Arctic+waters:+cooperation+or+conflict%3Fa0185210944 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (quoting HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 39
(statement of Prime Minister Trudeau Oct. 24, 1969)). Again, in its response to the
U.S. diplomatic note in 1970, the Canadian government reiterated "its determination
to open up the Northwest Passage to safe navigation for the shipping of all nations,
subject, however, to necessary conditions required to protect the delicate ecological
balance of the Canadian Arctic." Id. (quoting HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 39
(statement of Prime Minister Trudeau (Oct. 24, 1969)).
385.
Agreement on the North American Aerospace Defense Command, supra
note 330; see supratext accompanying note 330.
386.
See J.L. Granastein, Does the Northwest Passage Still Matter?, WESTERN
STANDARD CA, Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://www.westernstandard.ca/website/
article.php?id=2948&start=O ("To concede that Canada controls it can have
implications on the other side of the globe, and seafaring states are fearful of a
precedent that might let less-responsible nations than Canada close off or seek to
exercise control over international sea routes.").
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A. The Effect of Recognizing Canada'sClaim
Although the fear that recognizing Canada's claim would create
a dangerous precedent is understandable, it is misplaced.
The
Canadian position does not seek to create an exception to the
international straits regime.
Rather, the position is that the
Northwest Passage is not and has never been an international strait.
As we demonstrated above, the criteria set out in the Corfu Channel
Case would seem to support this claim, given the paucity of non38 7
consensual voyages to date.
Alternatively, the Northwest Passage is readily distinguishable
from most real or potential international straits elsewhere because of
the historic presence of thick, hard multi-year ice. As was explained
above, Article 234 of UNCLOS recognized this distinguishing
characteristic; arguably, therefore, both this provision and the
Northwest Passage were implicitly excluded from the international
388
straits regime.
What is more, the statuses of most of the other waterways that
the United States sought to maintain as international straits have
now been resolved. There are, after all, five different legal regimes
for five different types of straits under UNCLOS. 38 9 Long-standing
conventions, such as the Montreux Convention with respect to the
Bosphorous and Dardanelles, which have operated to the mutual
benefit and satisfaction of all the parties involved, regulate a number
of important straits. 390 As for some of the world's other important
straits, some of which have been the source of tension, like the Strait
of Malacca or Torres Strait, their statuses as international straits
have been officially recognized in bilateral and multilateral treaties.
One of the most fundamental precepts of international law, pacta
sunt servanda, guarantees that the legal rights and obligations under
39 1
such international agreements must be respected.
A bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States
could not destabilize these other treaty regimes. To the contrary, a
bilateral Canada-U.S. agreement, especially if followed by a dozen or
more identical bilateral agreements between Canada and other allies,
would at least partly remove the Northwest Passage from the realm
of customary international law and subject it to a new sui generis
regime. A bilateral treaty could even explicitly foresee its use as a

387.
See supra pp. 1172-75.
388.
See supra Part VI.B.
389.
See UNCLOS, supra note 59 (throughout the convention discusses five
different types of straits).
390.
See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 223, at 95-96.
391.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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template for identical or similar bilateral treaties between one of the
parties and another state or states-just as was done in the ship
boarding treaty concluded between the United States and Liberia as
3 92
part of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Finally, the sheer volume of maritime traffic in these other
waterways guarantees their subjection to the right of transit passage,
regardless of what transpires in Canada's North.
In reality, the resolution of the Northwest Passage dispute has
possible consequences for the status of only one other waterway: the
Northern Sea Route. However, ice conditions are changing so quickly
on the Russian side of the Arctic Ocean that any ship wanting to sail
along the northern coast of Russia will soon, if not already, be able to
sail northwards of the Russian islands that create the channels that3
39
form the Northern Sea Route and fall within the Russian claim.
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the United States would physically
challenge Russia-a nuclear weapon state with considerable
For these reasons,
conventional forces-in that waterway.
Washington has to ask itself whether maintaining a legal position of
no real utility along the northern coast of Russia is worth the security
risk, from non-state actors, that will likely arise along the northern
coast of its own continent if the Northwest Passage is treated as an
international strait.
The uniqueness of the situation helps explain why former U.S.
Ambassador Paul Cellucci has called for Washington to recognize
Ottawa's claim. 394 There is, in fact, nothing for the United States to
lose and much for it to gain. Neither the United States nor Canada
can afford any delay. Whether we like it or not, the Arctic ice is
melting quickly; an international shipping route will appear along
North America's longest coastline, and a backdoor to the continent
will suddenly be ajar.
The Canadian government, instead of hoping that silence will
somehow secure its legal position, should be seeking ways to make
that position work for the United States, other responsible countries,
and reputable shipping companies. Cellucci's request that the State
Department re-examine the longstanding U.S. position has created
an opportunity to initiate bilateral negotiations that still could and
should be seized upon. However, finding our way to an agreement

392.
See Agreement Concerning Cooperation To Suppress the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea,
U.S.-Liber., Feb. 11, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm.
393.
Seth Borenstein, In Warming Arctic, 2 German Ships Traversing Northeast
Passage, Breaking News 24/7, Sept. 11, 2009, http:/Iblog.taragana.com/n/in-warmingarctic-2-german-ships-traversing-northeast-passage-166085/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009)
(showing the current commercial viability of the Northern Sea Route).
394.
See discussion supra p. 1190.
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will also require two separate but related tracks of confidencebuilding: on the one hand, a significant strengthening of Canada's
policing, search-and-rescue, icebreaking, and other capabilities along
the Northwest Passage; and on the other hand, improved cooperation
between the two countries with respect to the challenges posed by
shipping across the North. All of which requires coordination based
on sustained diplomatic engagement.

XI. MODEL NEGOTIATION ON NORTHERN WATERS

Paul Cellucci might well have been offering to negotiate when, in
October 2004, he commented that "perhaps when this [the Northwest
Passage] is brought to the table again, we may have to take another
look." 395 Yet the Canadian government seems to have made no effort
to look beyond the now slightly opened door. Canada did not step
forward until August 2007, abruptly and at the highest of levels,
when Prime Minister Stephen Harper told President George W. Bush
about Cellucci's expressed views. 396 Without any preparatory
diplomacy, the news fell on deaf ears.
It was in this context that the authors of this Article contacted
Cellucci and suggested a "model negotiation" to delineate a path for
official diplomacy. He agreed, and, on February 18 and 19, 2008, we
met in the boardroom of the Canadian Section of the International
Joint Commission in Ottawa. The venue was chosen for its symbolic
value, with the IJC representing a century of institutionalized
bilateral cooperation concerning issues of sovereignty, environmental
protection, shipping, and water-use along the U.S.-Canada border,
3 97
including in the Great Lakes.
Two teams of non-governmental experts provided backup for
us. 398 Our goal was to discuss issues, identify possible solutions, and
make joint recommendations-aimed
at both governmentsconcerning navigation in Northern waters, including but not limited
to the Northwest Passage.
We began by agreeing on the reasons for the urgent need for
government-to-government talks. As was explained above, increased

395.
Id.
396.
No US-Canada Thaw on Arctic: Officials, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug.
20, 2007; Tonda MacCharles & Bruce Campion-Smith, Troops Out by '09, Bush Told,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 21, 2007, at Al.
397.
See International Joint Commission, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/enl
backgroundijc cmi nature.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (describing the role of the
International Joint Commission).
398.
See Who Owns the Arctic?, Model Negotiation on Northern Waters, Feb. 19,
2008, http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/model-negotiation-on-northern-waters.html (last
visited Oct 9, 2009) (providing a list of all participants).
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northern shipping will bring heightened security risks, ranging from
3 99
drug smuggling and illegal immigration to nuclear trafficking.
There will also be greater environmental risks, most notably with
respect to oil spills. 40 0 We also agreed that the long history of U.S.Canada cooperation in the Arctic indicates the potential for bilateral
So too does the history of cooperation on shipping
agreement.
through other waters under national jurisdiction, including the St.
Lawrence Seaway, the Great Lakes, and the Juan de Fuca region
between Vancouver Island and Washington State. This potential
long exercise,
became even clearer by the end of the day-and-a-half
40 1
when we agreed on nine concrete recommendations.
Our first recommendation was that the United States and
Canada collaborate in developing parallel rules, standards, and
cooperative enforcement mechanisms for notification and interdiction
zones in the northern waters of both Alaska and Canada. This
recommendation would see the United States adopt a mandatory
Arctic shipping registration scheme that would protect, among other
things, the western approaches of the Northwest Passage, thus
keeping suspect vessels at bay and alerting Canada about foreign
ships headed its way. It would also enable Canada to change its
current voluntary Arctic shipping registration system (NORDREG)
into a mandatory scheme without fear of eliciting an American
402
protest.
Second, we recommended that the United States and Canada
share maritime surveillance in northern waters and cooperatively
develop further surveillance capabilities. This recommendation is
consistent with the May 2006 expansion of the functions of the North
American Aerospace Defence Command to include surveillance over
'40 3
maritime approaches and "internal waterways.
Third, we recommended that the two countries build on Canada's
already strict Arctic marine environmental protection laws by
developing even more advanced navigation, safety and ship
construction, and operation standards. This recommendation accepts
the legitimacy of the current application of Canada's Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act to the Northwest Passage and seeks to
improve upon it, including by promoting the adoption of equally strict
40 4
rules in the waters north of Alaska.

399.
See discussion supra notes 309-16 and accompanying text.
400.
See discussion supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
See Model Negotiation on Northern Waters, supra note 398 (describing the
401.
recommendations of two teams of non-governmental experts).
402.
See discussion supra pp. 1185-86.
403.
See discussion supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
404.
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Fourth, we recommended that the United States and Canada
cooperate on the establishment of shipping lanes, traffic management
schemes, and oil spill response plans for the northern waters of both
Alaska and Canada. Cooperative oil spill response plans already
exists for the Great Lakes, Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, Dixon
Entrance and Beaufort Sea, 40 5 but planning for cooperative responses
to emergencies makes sense across the entire northern coast of North
America, since it is a given that assets and personnel will be
requested and shared in any serious emergency. Of course, such
planning does not infringe on the sovereignty of either stateproviding that consent remains a prerequisite for any deployment of
assets into foreign waters or onto foreign soil. The same holds true
for the establishment of shipping lanes and traffic management
schemes, where consultation and coordination-for instance, ensuring
that any shipping lanes in the U.S. portion of the Beaufort Sea meet
up with the lanes on the Canadian side-is both logical and entirely
non-threatening.
Fifth, we recommended that the two countries cooperatively
address the immigration and search-and-rescue concerns arising from
the increasing number of cruise ships in northern waters. One
obvious step would be for each country to require the submission of
full crew and passenger lists as part of a mandatory ship registration
scheme-consistent with our first recommendation. 40 6
The
submission of crew and passenger lists would facilitate the full
enforcement of Canadian immigration laws, including visa and other
documentary requirements, within the Northwest Passage-to the
benefit of both countries.
Sixth, we recommended that both Canada and the United States
acquire new icebreakers to replace their ageing coast guard vessels.
As it happened, just one week after we made this recommendation,
the Canadian government set aside $720 million for a replacement for
Canada's largest and oldest icebreaker, the Louis S. St-Laurent. 407
In addition, we recommended that the two countries maximize
burden-sharing opportunities with respect to their icebreakers,
following the models of a U.S.-Canada icebreaker agreement on the
Great Lakes and a similar agreement on the resupply of Thule Air
Base in Greenland. Indeed, if the countries engaged in more burdensharing, the construction of new Canadian icebreakers could reduce
the number of ships (and thus the expense) involved in recapitalizing
the U.S. icebreaker fleet and constitute a tacit recognition of

405.
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Canada's willingness and competence to manage the Northwest
Passage and other northern waters.
Seventh, we recommended that the two countries develop safety
infrastructure, including navigation aids and perhaps even new port
facilities in support of northern shipping. This recommendation,
again, is aimed at promoting U.S. action in the waters north of
Alaska that mirrors and supports Canadian action in the Northwest
Passage. For though the burden would fall heaviest on Canada, the
provision of a safe and economically efficient shipping route through
the archipelago-complete with navigation aids, detailed charts, fast
and reliable search and rescue, ports of haven, and perhaps even
icebreaking for convoys of cargo vessels-would go a long way to
securing political and eventually legal support for Canada's claim.
Eighth, we recommended that Canada and the United States
make maximum use of the considerable legal powers they already
possess over vessels, either sailing to or from Canadian or U.S. ports
or registered in one or the other country. This, indeed, has been the
focus of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the American-led
endeavour which has led sixty countries (including Canada) to
exercise their existing rights within their ports, territorial seas, and
on ships carrying their flags to prevent the use of the high seas for
Most of the cargo vessels using the
proliferation purposes. 408
Northwest Passage will begin or end their voyages in Canadian or
U.S. ports, and some will be registered in one or the other country.
Instead of exercising these legal powers solely for anti-proliferation
purposes, port state and flag state rights should also be put to use in
ensuring that vessels in the Northwest Passage and north of Alaska
meet and exceed the environmental, safety, and security standards
required under Canadian and U.S. law.
Ninth, we recommended the creation of a U.S.-Canada Arctic
Navigation Commission to promote dialogue, conduct studies, and
make policy proposals on matters of navigation, environmental
protection, security, safety, and sustainable economic development.
Like the International Joint Commission, this would be a purely
recommendatory body, though it could be granted an ad hoc
arbitration role if and when the two governments desired.
We did try, during the opening phase of the model negotiation, to
achieve a workable resolution of the dispute over the legal status of
the Northwest Passage. It soon became clear that this would take
longer than the day and a half available to us, which is why we
decided to focus on other opportunities for cooperation that could then
act as confidence-building steps towards that further goal. However,

408.

See supra text accompanying notes 307-08.

1210

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42.'1133

we were able to agree that the U.S. government should examine the
arguments in favor of recognizing Canada's legal position.
The consequences of climate change in the Northwest Passage
clearly require serious attention, increased cooperation, and,
ultimately, legal reconciliation between North America's two Arctic
countries. Our model negotiation demonstrated the potential for
constructive engagement between Canadians and Americans on this
important issue. Protecting Canada's interests in the Northwest
Passage-and the interests of other responsible states and reputable
shipping companies-requires a multifaceted approach. We need to
invest in infrastructure and enforcement capabilities, reach out to
other countries diplomatically, identify common concerns, and use
international law in support of imaginative, workable solutions. With
the ice disappearing quickly, agreeing to disagree is no longer a viable
policy for either Canada or the United States.

